I started Richard Nixon's 1980 book, The Real War. Nixon's
argument in this book is essentially that Communism is expanding
throughout the world, and the United States is losing the Cold War.
I
have a certain degree of nostalgia as I read this book, to tell you the
truth. I grew up reading right-wing books and magazines about the
expansion of Communism, and I actually enjoyed reading them.
Why? For a variety of reasons. For one, there was a dramatic quality
to them. You had your good guys, your bad guys, your conspiracies,
etc. Second, these books and magazines allowed me to feel like the
smartest person in the room because they questioned prominent narratives
that many held, allowing me to feel like they were informing me of
things that others did not know. This literature questioned the
narratives that FDR was a good President, that Joe McCarthy was a bad
guy, that Gorbachev was truly liberalizing the Soviet Union, and the
list goes on.
I used to write papers for my seventh-grade Social
Studies class that had a John Bircher sort of spin on history and
current events, and my teacher one time asked me, "Do you sleep that
well at night?" That was a good question. I slept very well at night.
As a matter of fact, reading Bircher-like material was like a bed-time
story for me. How could I have slept so well, if I thought that the
Russians would take the U.S. over? I don't know. Did I take what I was
reading all that seriously? I thought I was. Perhaps I believed that
Christ would come back and set things right, so I didn't have much to
worry about.
I'm somewhat ashamed to say that I feel nostalgia
when reading Nixon's book. It's easy for me to sit in my nice,
comfortable room, reading a book about the Cold War. The fact is,
however, that these were events that dramatically affected people's
lives. People lost their homes and their lives during the Vietnam War,
to use an example. This happened as a result of American bombing, but
the Communists in Vietnam were also far from perfect, for they
themselves killed and murdered without compunction. Recently, I watched
Oliver Stone's Salvador, which was about El Salvador during
the early years of the Reagan Administration. It's sad that we were
backing that cruel, murderous regime. And yet, what else could we have
done, when Communists were trying to take over the country, and
Communists had already succeeded in setting up satellite states
throughout the world? I think that it was Gorbachev who remarked that
nobody "won" the Cold War. Considering the loss of life that
accompanied this conflict, I have to agree with him.
Nixon in The Real War
is not a John Bircher. But he is concerned about the expansion of
Communism throughout the world. He argues that the aftermath of World
War II weakened certain bulwarks to Communist expansion: Britain,
Germany, and Japan. Nixon argues that Stalin even during the war had an
eye on its aftermath, as Stalin set up armies in Eastern Europe so that
he could gain control of those countries once the war had ended. Nixon
here reminds me of something that was said in Joe McCarthy's book, America's Retreat from Victory, and John Stormer's 1964 classic, None Dare Call It Treason:
McCarthy and Stormer argue that Churchill wanted for the allies to
attack Germany by coming up through Italy rather than by entering
through Western Europe, since the former strategy could prevent the
Soviets from gaining a foothold in Eastern Europe. McCarthy and Stormer
seem to believe that the allies' failure to pursue Churchill's policy
was deliberate on the part of certain high-ranking American officials,
whereas Nixon attributes it more to short-sightedness.
Nixon's
discussion of the Middle East is interesting. He is critical of Middle
Eastern leaders who nationalize Western industries in their country. On
page 83, he says that Prime Minister Mossadegh's nationalization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company led to disastrous results: a slowing of oil
production and economic development, a lagging in the Shah's land
reform, and the thriving of the Communist Tudeh party. Nixon
essentially acknowledges that the CIA played a role in overthrowing
Mossadegh, and Nixon----one who often denies that the U.S. was
aggressive in its treatment of other countries----seems to express no
problem with that.
Nixon laments the fall of the Shah in Iran, for
he argues that the Shah was a bulwark against Communist designs on the
Persian Gulf, designs rooted in the Communists' desire to influence the
supply of oil to Europe. Nixon's discussion of Iraq caught my
attention, for, while Nixon does not think that Iraq will be
pro-Western, he does note with some favor that it has suppressed
internal Communists. If I'm not mistaken, this was during the Saddam
Hussein years.
Another interesting part of my latest reading was
Nixon's journey through Russian history. Nixon essentially argues that
the Communists in the Soviet Union are a continuation of the Tsars, who
were autocratic and expansionist. Nixon even notes that Karl Marx was a
critic of Tsarist Russian expansionism, which was ironic, considering the
expansionism that Russia later made in his name! And yet, Nixon argues
that Communist ideology serves Russian expansionism in that it allows
the Soviets to maintain that their imperialism champions the cause of
the lower economic classes.
I'll close this post by quoting something that Nixon says on page 27,
about why dictators in Africa might consider becoming a Soviet proxy to
be attractive:
"When the leaders of
African nations go shopping, the Soviets offer them a tempting grab
bag. The Soviet military-industrial complex runs overtime, so they
always have ample supplies of weapons to offer, sometimes at bargain
prices, and without the delays occasioned by debates over the 'morality'
of trafficking in arms. The Soviet catalogue lists many other
accessories for the dictator: East German 'security' experts, Cuban
troops, timely tips from the Soviet intelligence networks, and, as Luttwak neatly
puts it, 'The broad support of Soviet propaganda, which will
ceaselessly proclaim their virtues, even if they do have a weakness for
executing people at random.' Aggressive marketers, the Soviets have
recently taken to shipping their clients whole proxy armies as well.
They demand payment for their goods in the currency of power. The
Soviets have not made the na[i]ve mistake of assuming that African
leaders care most about economic development for their people. From
their own experience the Soviets know that the first priority of many of
these leaders is to maintain themselves in power, and they, not we,
offer the most effective 'foreign aid' for this purpose."