Book Write-Up: Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview

J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig.  Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview.  IVP Academic, 2003.  See here to purchase the book.

J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig are reputable philosophers and apologists.  This book, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, covers a variety of philosophical issues and views and discusses how they can relate to a Christian worldview.

The book is 626 pages and has 31 chapters, along with “Suggestions for Further Reading” concerning each chapter.  I will not comment on all 31 chapters, but I will say something about each “Part,” as the book is organized into six Parts.  Then, I will offer some general impressions about the book.

Part I defines philosophy, justifies it from a Christian perspective, and sets forth rules of logic (in which you use letters and symbols to represent arguments).  My favorite passage in this Part is when Moreland and Craig respond to a Christian argument that human reason is corrupt as a result of the Fall, and thus philosophy is useless.  Moreland and Craig note that the Bible employs reason and logic, even when speaking to the sinful and unregenerate.

Part II concerns epistemology: can we know anything, and how do we know what we know?  It critiques skepticism and postmodernism, while also discussing Alvin Plantinga’s view that naturalism should logically lead to skepticism.  It discusses justification: are internal criteria (i.e., our senses, our minds) sufficient for us to say that we know something (i.e., that the ball is red), or are criteria external to us (i.e., we see a red ball because red light bounces off of the ball) essential?  This Part also explores religious epistemology: do we know that certain religious claims are true, and, if so, how?  The exploration of religious epistemology largely covers Alvin Plantinga’s work.

Some things stood out to me in this Part.  First, the authors said that skepticism and postmodernism are self-refuting because they make the truth claim that accurate truth claims are impossible.  I rolled my eyes at this, expecting that to be their sole attempt to refute skepticism and postmodernism, but I was wrong.  They justify this argument, addressing the counterargument that we should make an exception for the skeptical truth claim.  They also interacted with arguments for skepticism.  Second, the authors quoted a passage in which Charles Darwin expressed a fear that evolutionary naturalism challenges epistemology.  In a July 3, 1881 letter to William Graham Down, Darwin stated: “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.  Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”  Third, in discussing Plantinga’s argument that naturalism can lead to skepticism about evolutionary theory, I saw that Plantinga employed a few bizarre hypotheticals (i.e., suppose you have an animal that feels pleasure when it is attacked).  Craig and Moreland themselves occasionally use bizarre hypotheticals.  It’s probably something that philosophers do.  It still strikes me as bizarre.

Part III is about metaphysics.  One chapter spent a lot of time on the different kinds of nominalism as they relate to the color red: can we say that there is a general category of red, or should we reject the concept of general categories because each object is unique?  In reading this, I wanted to throw up my hands and say, “Look, there are objects that have different shades of red!  Why does this have to be so difficult?”  This Part also discussed the mind-body problem: the question of whether humans have souls or just physical brains.  On page 300, Moreland and Craig state: “Just because computers can imitate intelligence, or because we continue to learn more about the brain and its interaction with the soul, it does not follow that there is no soul and no enduring self.”  I think these things should be taken very seriously, though, since they relate to the question of whether the mind can be attributed to the brain, and whether the brain can produce free thoughts (contrary to determinism, which Moreland and Craig believe materialism entails).  Another topic that this Part covered was “Free Will and Determinism.”  My understanding is that Moreland and Craig support libertarianism, the idea that humans have free will and are the authors of their choices.  Yet, they are fair to compatibilism (the idea that choices are caused) and wrestle with its arguments.  Do they present a libertarianism that acknowledges that certain factors influence our choices?  Maybe, but I do not clearly recall their presentation of it.

Part IV concerns philosophy of science.  I would like to make five points about this Part.  First, Moreland and Craig provide an effective section about the different conceptualizations of “laws” and “theories.”  As Moreland and Craig point out, most scientists reject the idea that theories are mere guesses, which become laws after being proven.  This section was informative.  Second, there were places in which I thought that Moreland and Craig were flirting with creationism, anti-evolutionism, and Flood Geology, but I could be wrong on this.  They may have just been using examples of arguments that they deemed relevant to the discussion: they also cited as relevant the view that nature has flawed design and thus probably was not designed.  Third, Moreland and Craig showed how empiricism and realism can run contrary to each other.  This can initially appear counter-intuitive, since do not both acknowledge the existence of an outside world and hold that we can arrive at fairly accurate knowledge about it?  Actually, because empiricism focuses solely on what we can see, that leaves out a lot of knowledge!  Fourth, I appreciated the authors’ engagement of anti-realist arguments.  On page 334, for example, Moreland and Craig refer to an anti-realist observation that “In the history of science, many theories have explained phenomena, generated fruitful research and accurate predictions, yet were later abandoned as false.”  Fifth, the authors discuss the role of Newton’s theology in some of his scientific conclusions, and how Einstein would later disagree with Newton.  That actually came out in the first episode of the National Geographic TV series, Genius!

Part V was about ethics.  Is there an objective foundation for ethics?  Are ethics relative or absolute?  Here, I think that the authors made a special effort to convey how the other side (from their standpoint) would respond to criticisms.  There were times in reading this book when I wondered if the authors’ presentation of a perspective was complete, if an actual adherent to the perspective would accept the authors’ conceptualization of their viewpoint, or if an adherent would be able to respond to the authors’ easy knock-down punch of their ideas.  In short, would the adherents say “Wait a minute!” after reading the authors’ presentation of their position?  There was a little more back and forth in the section on utilitarianism (though, of course, Moreland and Craig are the ones summarizing the different perspectives).

I am ambivalent about some of the authors’ arguments in this Part.  Against utilitarianism’s claim that we should do what maximizes our pleasure and minimizes our pain, Moreland and Craig ask about those who find immoral acts pleasurable.  Moreland and Craig also robustly argue that egoism by itself cannot be a foundation for ethics: it can be part of the equation, but it cannot uphold ethics on its own.  Maybe they have a point here, but I wonder: Is it too much of a stretch for me to go from saying that I want good things for myself, to saying that I should want good things for others, too, since the other is just as valuable as I am?  Moreland and Craig dispute utilitarianism’s claim that we should define ethics according to what is the greatest good for the greatest number by saying that we do not always know the long-term effects of certain actions, and whether those effects are good or bad.  Perhaps, but should consequences be considered irrelevant in defining an action as moral or immoral?  If we see that an action consistently makes people miserable, should we hold out hope that eventually it might have a positive effect, or can we arrive at a fairly safe conclusion that there may be something wrong with the action?  Moreland and Craig appeal a couple of times to the value of moral intuition, and yet, in arguing against relativism, they note cultures that have a different morality.  If we all have a reliable moral intuition, then how do we account for the cultures that have practices that are morally offensive, from a number of people’s standpoints?  Finally, Moreland and Craig are trying to argue that God needs to exist for there to be a foundation for objective morality.  I question how much the existence of God actually solves.  Granted, you have God, and God enforces morality, which comes from God’s character.  But we still have to figure out what God wants.  We have our own conceptions of God.  And there are passages in the Bible that many today find morally offensive.  Moreland and Craig undoubtedly would have their responses to these concerns: they believe that there is apologetic evidence for the biblical God, and they would have their explanations for the morally offensive passages of Scripture.  Still, I wonder: does believing in God result in an understanding of objective moral values, when there is still a lot of subjectivity in the world?  In areas, perhaps.

Part VI covers such topics as arguments for the existence of God, God’s attributes, the problem of evil, the Trinity, the relationship between Jesus’ divine and human natures at the incarnation, and Christian exclusivism.  I have some points.  First, the coverage of the cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God was effective.  Moreland and Craig argued that some of the models upheld by critics of these arguments themselves presume that the universe does not go back infinitely, or have some assumption of fine-tuning.  Moreland and Craig seem to consider the ontological argument to be a good argument, even though I still look at it and think, “What the heck?”  Second, Moreland and Craig were unafraid to think outside the box, and that is commendable.  They believe that God has existed in time ever since creating the universe, as opposed to being outside of time.  They also offer a rehabilitation of Apollinaris (whom has been considered a heretic) that they believe remains within orthodoxy: that Jesus can still be fully human when his mind is the divine logos, since humans are made in God’s image.  This is brilliant, but they did not offer a robust answer to the question of how Jesus’ mind can be the divine logos, and yet Jesus can still be tempted to sin, or can be afraid.  They tried to address this question, but they failed, in my opinion.  Third, I liked their argument in their discussion of the problem of evil that there are many good things in the world, that many of us, notwithstanding our suffering, consider life to be worth living.  Fourth, I did not care for their defense of Christian exclusivism.  They say that God loves everyone and wants everyone to be saved, and yet that God put those whom he knew would not believe in contexts in which they would never hear the Gospel.  Couldn’t God at least offer them an actual opportunity, if God loved them so much?

In terms of general assessments, this book is helpful in terms of the background information that it provides.  The back cover calls it an “introduction” to philosophy.  I am not sure if I would have understood it as well as I did had I not had previous exposure to the philosophical concepts in the book.  And, even then, there were parts that were over my head.  For me, the book put pieces of what I knew in context, while also exposing me to additional nuances and shades of thought.  The authors try to be lucid and in many cases succeed: I could understand the broad thrust of what they were saying, even if some of the details escaped me.  They also used examples and illustrations, which could be helpful.  Maybe a person with no exposure to philosophy could get something out of this book: he or she may have to read it slowly, though!

That said, I give the book five stars because it was informative and wrestled with different positions.

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: The Resurrection Fact

John J. Bombaro and Adam S. Francisco.  The Resurrection Fact: Responding to Modern Critics.  New Reformation Publications, 2016.  See here to purchase the book.

Allow me to quote the description of the book on Amazon, before I offer my thoughts about it.  The description says who wrote the book, the book’s general perspective, and the book’s intended audience.

“As this team did with the book, ‘Making The Case For Christianity’ (CPH), Drs. Bombaro and Francisco bring together a variety of contemporary Lutheran apologists to respond to a wide array of challenges to the heart of the Christian Faith. Each chapter addresses a specific argument from a popular, non-Christian author and offer a clear and concise rebuttal and argument for the resurrection. The editors have found able representatives from the disciplines of biblical studies, history, philosophy, and the legal profession to write each chapter. The book is accessible, written for a broad audience, and is ultimately designed to equip its readers for the apologetics task.”

Now for my thoughts:

A.  Whenever I see a book like this, I wonder if it will contribute anything new to the discussion.  So many Christian apologetic books have already been written defending the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.  Does this book contribute anything new?  I will later detail what I learned from this book, but, in response to the question of whether it contributes anything earth-shakingly new to the debate, I would say that it does not.  It responds to skeptics with the usual apologetic spiel, even though many of those skeptics have already raised objections to that spiel.  How about responding to their objections to the spiel, rather than regurgitating the spiel itself?  I will address how they could have done this in the next item.

B.  I have heard that, in writing a book review, I should avoid talking about the book that I wish the authors had written and instead focus on the book as it is.  I am going to depart from that rule in this item because I do believe that there are things that the authors could have done to make this book better.  This book could have responded to skeptics without regurgitating the usual apologetic spiel, while still being accessible to a broad audience who would not want to get lost in scholarly minutiae.  It could have done so by interacting with specific topics.  For example, there is the debate about whether Jesus’ resurrection in Paul’s writings was an exchange of a physical body for a spiritual body (while the physical body remains in the grave) or a resuscitation and transformation of a body: the latter option implies the empty tomb, which apologists deem to be physical evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, whereas the former does not.  There is debate about whether Second Temple Judaism had a conception of resurrection that was a bodily exchange rather than a bodily transformation; this is significant because apologists in this book assert that Second Temple Judaism only conceived of resurrection as physical transformation of a dead body into a living body.  On that basis, they argue that Jesus’ resurrection was physical, meaning early Christian belief in Jesus’ resurrection arose from Jesus’ resurrection itself and not from seeing a ghost.  Another debate is whether there are parallels between the Gospels’ resurrection stories and themes in Greco-Roman literature; one author in the book briefly touches on this, but more discussion would have been helpful.  And, if one wants to respond to Bart Ehrman’s textual critical arguments, how about engaging some of the texts that he cites—-the texts that he believes reflect theological revision on the part of the proto-orthodox scribes—-rather than casually dismissing Ehrman’s argument by saying that most of the differences among New Testament versions are theologically insignificant?  Such discussions would have responded to skeptics in a fruitful, engaging, fairer, and more interesting manner.  It also would have brought these debates to a broader audience.

C.  The description of the book highlighted that the apologists were Lutheran, and that made me wonder if they would add a distinct Lutheran perspective to the debate.  I saw that in this book occasionally.  The author of the introduction lists among his pieces of evidence for Jesus’ resurrection “the continual assertion by the disciples and apostles that the living Christ was with them in the Eucharist and governing them by his Spirit…”  I vaguely recall a reference to baptismal regeneration.  There was also a discussion of Martin Luther’s conception of faith.  Overall, though, the distinctly Lutheran references were  rare.  Much of the book was the usual apologetic spiel!

D.  I did learn things from this book.  A few of the authors referred to scholar Craig Evans’ scholarship on Jewish burial.  They argued that the Sanhedrin ensured that crucified Jewish bodies were disposed of properly, and that Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus may have been commissioned by the Sanhedrin to ensure Jesus’ burial.  That may differ from seeing Joseph and Nicodemus as nobly stepping forward out of devotion to Jesus (see John 19:38-39), but it does coincide with Acts 13:28-29’s statement that the Jewish leaders as a whole buried Jesus.
Mark Pierson refers to a scholarly source that disagrees with the idea that Papias was historically unreliable.  Papias is a significant figure in debates about whether the Gospels are based on eyewitness testimony.

Another author referred to a book about rabbinic views on Jesus’ resurrection, and another author mentioned Christian writings as early as the sixteenth century (maybe earlier) that tried to harmonize the Gospels’ resurrection stories.

C.J. Armstrong and Andrew DeLoach explore the nuances of mystery religions, including the question of whether they focused on the afterlife.  They also discussed the difficulty in ascertaining what the Mithra cult actually believed.  Their essay was probably the best in the book, even though it could have been more consistent.  (Was Jesus myth entering historical reality, or was Jesus different from other mythical figures?  The authors claimed both.)

E.  Back to the issue of Jewish burial practices, John Bombaro states in the book that “Scholarly opinion agrees with Craig that the Jews of Jesus’s day fastidiously observed Torah burial mandates regardless of the deceased’s economic status and circumstances.”  Relying on the synoptic Gospels, however, a number of Christians believe that the Jewish authorities transgressed a lot of Passover laws in trying Jesus (Craig Parton refers to this issue in an endnote).  Were the Jewish authorities fastidious in their Torah observance or not?

F.  I think that the book based some of its prominent arguments on certain assumptions.  More than one author said that the disciples could not have stolen Jesus’ corpse from the tomb because guards were at the tomb site, as the Gospel of Matthew states.  That assumes that the Gospel of Matthew was historically accurate on this detail.  The Gospel of Mark, which many scholars believe is earlier, does not say there were guards at Jesus’ tomb.  More than one author said that the Roman and Jewish authorities would have presented Jesus’ corpse to the public to refute the emerging Christian movement, had Jesus’ tomb not been empty.  That assumes that the Roman and Jewish authorities were preoccupied with Christianity.  A few authors said that early Christian eyewitnesses would have prevented historically-inaccurate details from getting into the Gospels, but were things really that neat?

G.  A few authors attempted to refute the skeptical idea that people in the first century were especially gullible, and thus we cannot trust the early Christian claim that Jesus rose from the dead.  They did not engage the examples that Richard Carrier has cited of this.  And yet, one of the authors did well to observe that the disciples in the Gospels were initially skeptical after hearing that Jesus rose from the dead.  Granted, Jesus seems to rebuke their skepticism (Luke 24:25; John 20:29), but the Gospels present the disciples as the opposite of gullible, perhaps showing some respect for critical thought.

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher through Cross Focused Reviews.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: Who Are You to Judge?, by Erwin W. Lutzer

Erwin W. Lutzer.  Who Are You to Judge?  Learning to Distinguish Between Truths, Half-Truths, and Lies.  Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2002, 2016.  See here to buy the book.

“Judge not, that ye be not judged” (KJV).  So said Jesus in Matthew 7:1.

What did Jesus mean, though?  Does Jesus forbid Christians to evaluate people, behaviors, or beliefs?

Erwin Lutzer, the senior pastor of Moody Church, addresses this question.  Lutzer is critical of trends in Christianity that pursue church unity at the expense of doctrinal and moral soundness.  As Lutzer rejects the idea that Matthew 7:1 prohibits Christians from making evaluations, he wrestles with what Jesus meant.  Lutzer concludes that Jesus in Matthew 7:1 forbids condemning people, judging their motives, and trying to morally purify others without working on oneself (i.e., the beam in their own eye, according to Matthew 7:3).

Lutzer spends the remainder of the book discussing how Christians can judge various things: doctrine; prophets; miracles; entertainment; physical appearance; neopaganism; supernatural manifestations (i.e., ghosts and angels); conduct; and moral character.  In the process, Lutzer wrestles with different issues, such as biblical teaching on wealth (in reference to the prosperity Gospel), the debate between continuationism and cessationism, the occult, and the validity of the healings at Lourdes.

Here are some thoughts:

A.  Lutzer’s discussion on Matthew 7:1 was effective, overall.  This was especially the case when Lutzer looked at the Sermon on the Mount and noted that Jesus’ commands implied that his disciples should make judgments.  There were aspects of the discussion that remained unresolved, however.  According to Lutzer, Jesus forbids people to judge others’ motives.  Yet, Lutzer notes that Jesus, in exhorting his disciples not to cast their pearls before swine (Matthew 7:6), presumes that his disciples should judge who is a swine.  Does not judging a person to be a swine cast judgment on that person’s motives?

B. Lutzer believes that not every miracle is from God.  For Lutzer, a miracle may be a demonic deception, there may be a natural explanation for it, or it could be made-up.  Lutzer says that there were miracles in the ancient world outside of Christianity, and that there are miracles in non-Christian religions.

Such discussions in this book stood out to me, on account of my reading of Christian apologetics, and arguments against Christian apologetics.  Many Christian apologists have argued that miracles, especially Jesus’ resurrection, attest to the truth of Christianity.  But if non-Christians can perform miracles, too, does that not undermine the evidentiary value of miracles in demonstrating the truth Christianity?  There are Christian apologists who argue that Christianity has been unique (or a rarity) in the miracles department, but Lutzer does not appear to go that route.

I have not yet read Lutzer’s apologetic works, but I will be interested to see how he treats miracles in those writings.

C.  Lutzer seems to have problems with miracles that are performed without any concern about what the beneficiary believes or does morally.  And, on the basis of Hebrews 1:14, Lutzer argues that angels assist believers, not non-believers (or, more accurately, Lutzer says there is no Scriptural evidence that they help non-believers).  Lutzer is critical of stories about angels helping people who lack Christian faith.

Lutzer’s arguments deserve consideration.  Lutzer notes that the gift of healing in I Corinthians was a spiritual gift within the church.  In addition, one can argue that Jesus was not merely a traveling miracle-worker, as there was a significant spiritual component to his message.

Lutzer’s stance, as I understand it, does rub me the wrong way, though.  There are indications in Scripture that God cares for and blesses those who do not know God (Matthew 5:45; Acts 14:17), or whose knowledge of God is only partial (Acts 10).  Perhaps God can heal non-believers or send them angels as part of God’s kindness that is intended to lead them to repentance (Romans 2:4).  Moreover, Jesus healed ten lepers, and only one came back to thank him (Luke 17:11-19), so perhaps Jesus does heal people, knowing that they will not always respond in the proper spiritual fashion.

D.  Lutzer’s discussion of Romans 14 is especially helpful.  For Lutzer, the passage is not about avoiding offense of people, for Jesus offended people.  Rather, the passage is about being compassionate about where people are and the sins with which they struggle.  That makes sense, in light of the passage itself and as a practical rule in life.

E.  Lutzer’s chapter on integrity was pastoral, but it could have been more so.  For Lutzer, integrity demands that a person do the right thing, regardless of the cost.  A person who received workman’s comp after claiming that his injury was work-related when actually it was from a hunting accident, for example, should turn himself in and go to jail, as far as Lutzer is concerned.  Fraud should not be tolerated, but how would Lutzer address reservations that the man may have about turning himself in?  If this man goes to jail, how will that impact his family?

There are places, though, in which Lutzer recognizes and appreciates the complexity of issues, particularly when he discusses how Christian parents can respond when their children read Harry Potter novels.

F.  Lutzer had good advice.  He talks about an elderly man who stopped vegetating in front of the television set and started writing letters to missionaries and praying for them.  And, on page 140, Lutzer states: “Don’t close your Bible until you have something from it that will fill your soul for that day.”

Overall, this is an enjoyable book.  Lutzer wrestles with difficult questions.  Scripture plays a significant role in this book, though there are times when Lutzer speculates without much Scriptural backing.  The anecdotes in the book enhance it, for they make the book more interesting and relatable, while also giving the book a tone of authority, as Lutzer connects his discussions with real life (assuming the stories are accurate).

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher.  My review is honest!

Movie Write-Up: God's Not Dead 2

I watched the 2016 Christian movie, God’s Not Dead 2, on Amazon last night.  God’s Not Dead 2 is the sequel to the 2014 movie God’s Not Dead.

Here are some items.  In the course of my commentary, I will share aspects of the movie’s plot.

A.  Martin Yip was in God’s Not Dead.  He was from the People’s Republic of China, and he was a student in Professor Radisson’s philosophy class, along with Christian Josh Wheaton.  In God’s Not Dead 2, Martin approaches Pastor Dave with 147 questions about the Bible and Christianity!  Martin tells Pastor Dave that Josh told him that Pastor Dave might have answers to his questions.

One of Martin’s questions was especially good.  Martin referred to the Golden Rule in Luke 6:31, and Martin questioned whether it was possible for him to care about other people and their needs in the exact same way, or to the exact same extent, that he cares about his own.  I find that to be an excellent point.  I support caring for others and their well-being, and even doing things concretely to help them.  I also realize that, for the sake of peace and the well-being of others, I cannot always get what I want.  But seriously: of course I will prioritize my own needs over the needs of others’!  And, before you criticize me for saying this, here’s a newsflash: you do too!  For example, you work to earn money for yourself and your family.  You do not give your entire income away to another family!

Martin also said to Pastor Dave that, for every one of Pastor Dave’s answers, Martin had three more questions!  Pastor Dave likened this to a candle: the brighter the flame, the greater is the darkness around it.  I do not know how accurate that is, but I do like the concept of answers generating more questions, and answers to those questions generating more questions.  Wouldn’t one expect that, when it comes to an infinite, deep God?  How different this is from the situation in which evangelicals give pat answers to questions and expect that to close the door on the subject!

B.  In the first movie, Amy Ryan was a left-wing atheist blogger.  Then she learned that she was dying of cancer, and the Christian band, the Newsboys, prayed with her.  She became receptive to faith at that point.  In God’s Not Dead 2, Amy learns that her cancer is in remission, and the Newboys attribute that to divine healing.  But Amy is unsure about what she should do with her faith after this.  When she had cancer, she was clinging to Jesus for dear life, for that got her through her time of uncertainty.  Now that her time of uncertainty has passed, she does not know why she should have faith, or even if she wants to have faith.

I appreciated this part of the movie, since I deal with similar questions.  I have clinged to God for years because there has been a lack in my life.  Because I have Asperger’s, I do not have too many friends, and I have felt alone.  Also, I am not where I would like to be professionally.  I have wondered: suppose that I were liked by more people and were prospering financially?  Would I maintain my relationship with God, or would I leave God, becoming an atheist or a-religious agnostic?

Amy has a conversation with Pastor Jude, who is Pastor Dave’s friend from Africa.  Pastor Jude speculates that Amy still feels drawn to Jesus, on some level, and this is why she is still thinking about faith, even after her cancer remission.  And yet, he says that part of Amy doesn’t want anything to do with Jesus.  Amy could identify with that.  So can I!

C.  Brooke Thawly is a high-school student, and her brother was recently killed in an accident.  She is having difficulty moving on from that.  She meets with her history teacher, Grace Wesley, outside of school and the two of them have a discussion about faith.  Grace goes home that night to her grandfather, Walter (played by Pat Boone), and Walter says, “Atheism doesn’t take away the pain, only the hope!”

Is that true?  I can envision Christianity adding more pain rather than taking pain away!  If conservative Christians are correct that God damns to hell those who failed to accept Jesus in this life, would that make people feel better?  Fortunately, Brooke’s brother accepted Jesus before his death, but suppose he hadn’t?  Many people don’t!  Christian doctrines about heaven and hell would not comfort Brooke, in that case.  Plus, there is the problem of evil: if God could have saved the life of Brooke’s brother, why didn’t God do so?

At the same time, I can also envision Christianity adding a sliver of hope.  God is a personal being, not an inflexible doctrine, so who is to say that God absolutely, positively cannot save people who failed to commit to Jesus in this life?  That doesn’t mean that we should test God, but there is a sliver of hope, to which even some evangelicals appeal when discussing the issue of hell.

D.  The movie revolves around a court case.  Grace in a class lecture is asked a question by Brooke, and Grace answers Brooke’s question by talking about the role of Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s philosophy of non-violence.  Grace specifically cites and quotes Matthew 5:39.

Grace gets in trouble for that, as her superiors claim that she was teaching religion in a public school, which is unconstitutional.  The ACLU, representing Brooke, brings a lawsuit against Grace.

You would think that this sort of case would be absurd: Grace was not promoting Christianity by telling her students about the role of the Sermon on the Mount in American history!  She was making a historical point, not a religious point!

To my surprise, though, the ACLU attorney, Pete Kane, actually made some fairly decent points, which is not to say that a real ACLU attorney would make those arguments.  Kane said that Grace, by citing chapter and verse, was showing her class that she knew the Scriptures well and was a devout Christian, and thus was promoting religion as a teacher.  (One could counter that Grace, in citing chapter and verse, was showing that she was literate rather than religious, but I can still see Kane’s point, at least somewhat.)  Kane also attempted to establish a record of Grace proselytizing on school grounds: Grace invited teachers and staff to an activity at her church, Grace collected funds at school for a religious charity, and Grace broached the subject of religion to Brooke.

Grace’s union-appointed lawyer, Tom Endler, also made some decent points, but his points contradicted each other.  On the one hand, he wanted to deny that Grace was teaching religion in school.  He argued that Grace was simply making a historical point in response to a student’s question, rather than promoting Christianity.  In the course of the movie, he attempts to establish that Jesus was a historical figure, in order to argue that Grace has a right to talk about the teachings of Jesus in a classroom history course, as she would have a right to talk about the teachings of any other historical person.  On the other hand, Tom made the usual right-wing talking-point that separation of church and state is nowhere in the Constitution, and he seemed to argue that, in a diverse society, Grace shouldn’t be required to leave her faith at the door when she enters a public setting.

Grace herself had a contradictory attitude.  She maintained that she was simply making a historical point in class, but she also framed her perils in religious terms: she needs to be faithful to God, rather than the world!

E.  Sheila O’Malley at Roger Ebert’s site, not surprisingly, gives the movie a low grade.  Yet, she still praises the performance of Christian apologist J. Warner Wallace: “The only really good scene in the movie features real-life cold case homicide detective, J. Warner Wallace, who used his forensic statement analysis skills on the gospels, resulting in a book called ‘Cold Case Christianity.’ He’s put on the stand in defense of poor, wronged Grace Wesley, and his testimony is simply delivered and thought-provoking.”

Regarding J. Warner Wallace, I somewhat identify with what blogger DagoodS said in a comment on his blog, particularly when Dagood criticized Wallace for “treat[ing] 1st Century documents like 21st Century police-reports…”  One can legitimately argue that the two are apples and oranges!

Still, I appreciated Sheila O’Malley doing the unexpected and praising an aspect of the movie.

Book Write-Up: Taking Pascal's Wager, by Michael Rota

Michael Rota.  Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, Evidence and the Abundant Life.  Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016.  See here to purchase the book.

Michael Rota teaches philosophy at the University of St. Thomas, which is in St. Paul, Minnesota.  In Taking Pascal’s Wager, Rota argues that Pascal’s Wager has viability in encouraging people to believe in God.

Pascal’s Wager is often conceptualized as a bet, in which one looks at the options of believing in God and not believing in God to determine which is more beneficial to oneself, without knowing for certain whether God actually exists.  If God does exist and a person embraces God, then that person will gain spiritual health (i.e., hope, inner peace, etc.) in this life and eternal bliss in the afterlife.  If God exists and a person rejects God, by contrast, that person will lack spiritual health in this life and will have eternal misery in the afterlife.  Suppose that God does not exist, though?  Even in that case, a person can have spiritual health by believing in God, and lack spiritual health by thinking that this world is all there is.  In short, what does one have to lose by believing in God, or at least seeking God?

Pascal’s Wager, on the surface, can appear to be a selfish calculation, and yet, as Rota argues, it need not be so, for belief in God can encourage one to help others, as well.

In this review, I will look at select chapters and comment on select items.

Chapter 3, “Moral Reservations and the Cost of Commitment,” deserves praise because Rota does attempt to address difficult questions about Pascal’s Wager.  Of course, Rota addresses the conventional criticisms of it: that it trivializes faith by making it into a gamble, and a selfish gamble at that, and that it treats blind faith as a virtue rather than, say, kindness or the pursuit of truth.  But Rota also interacts with excellent questions.  For example, if God is not real, would not a person be wasting his or her time by pursuing devotional activities, rather than other activities during one’s limited time on earth?  And suppose that one lived in a country where Christianity was persecuted.  Would one do well to believe in Christ then, especially in a scenario in which the Christian God did not exist?  In some cases, Rota’s answers are deft and effective; in other cases, he falls back on saying that one should believe because there is a decent chance that the Christian God is real and that one can be separated from God in the afterlife by not believing in God.

A challenge to me in reading this chapter is that Rota seemed to argue that simply believing in God is not enough to gain the benefits of faith in this life: one actually needs to be a good Christian, or, more accurately, a sociable, likable Christian.  That can provide a person with social support from the Christian community, and perhaps appease potential persecutors.  But, as a person with Asperger’s, I wonder: what if a person believes in God, yet struggles socially?  Or what about the many people, period, who struggle in their Christian walk?  To his credit, though, Rota in the conclusion does offer practical, albeit brief, spiritual advice about prayer, reading Scripture, and finding a loving Christian community.

Chapter 4, “More Objections to the Wager: Other Religions and Christianity,” addresses a formidable question about the Wager: What about other religions?  Objectors have argued that Pascal’s Wager only talks about two choices: Christianity and atheism.  Does not the existence of other religions muddy the water, though, by adding other options, with their own benefits and risks?  Suppose that one selects Christianity, and it turns out that one had to be a Muslim to enter the good afterlife and avoid hell?

Rota recognizes the gravity of the problem, as is often the case when he deals with detractors of whatever he is defending in this book: Pascal’s Wager, the cosmological and fine-tuning arguments for the existence of God, the arguments for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, etc.  In a sense, this chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book, in which Rota argues that God exists and that there is a decent likelihood that Christianity is the true religion.

Chapter 5, “Where Did Physical Things Come From?”, was Rota’s explanation and defense (on some level) of the cosmological argument for the existence of God.  This chapter had an inviting, lucid tone, and Rota shone in this chapter as a gifted teacher.  Rota argued that contingent beings needed to originate from some necessary being, and Rota clearly explains the difference between contingent and necessary beings.  To his credit, Rota believes that the cosmological argument has its limits, for he can think of necessary entities other than God that can cause or sustain contingent entities.  A slight qualm that I had with this chapter was that Rota said that a necessary being always has to exist: a necessary being cannot exist at some point and later cease to exist, otherwise the being would not fit the definition of a necessary being, who necessarily exists (always has and always will).  Rota’s reasoning here appears sensible, yet I wonder if the contrast between necessary and contingent beings has to be so stark.  Could not a god or a creative force have always existed has far back into the past as one can go, yet at some point cease to exist?  Rota would probably have a decent answer to this question, and I would not defend my question to the end, but it is a question that occurs to me.

Chapters 6 and 8 concern the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God.  For Rota, the fine-tuning argument demonstrates that an intelligent being designed the cosmos.  Rota’s responses to most of the objections to the fine-tuning argument that he cites are effective, overall.  In my opinion, an exception would be his discussion of the multiverse.  An objection to the fine-tuning argument is that there are a lot of multiverses out there, many of which lack life, so it is not such a statistical wonder that at least one of those universes came together in such a manner as to support life.  Rota did not clearly address that objection.  This chapter had a lot of probabilistic equations.  Rota said that, if both God and multiverses exist, then there is a greater likelihood that many of those multiverses would have life, for God is a God of purpose and life.  That is an interesting point, but it fails to answer the objection.  Rota’s ultimate answer seems to be that, apart from a designer, the likelihood of life existing in any universe is minute.  I am unclear why that would be the case.  Even if Rota addressed that question, he could have been clearer and more direct.

Chapter 9 is entitled “The Beauty and Existential Resonance of Christianity.”  Rota argues that Christianity offers a beautiful moral standard while accounting for the reality that we fail to live up to it.  Later in the book, in chapter 12, Rota states that it makes sense that a God who exists would hide himself rather than making himself overly obvious—-so that people would believe in him voluntarily and for the right reasons.  Rota also states that a God who exists would probably start a church to pass on God’s teaching and assist people to follow it.  Rota essentially believes that Christianity is moral and makes sense, that it is the sort of revelation that the fine-tuning necessary being who started the cosmos and cares for it would make.  The problem of hell was occurring to me as I read this chapter, though.  Would a loving God condemn people in hell, especially when so many people seem to lack the opportunity to embrace God, or Christianity?  This question is especially pertinent because the threat of hell looms large in Pascal’s Wager.  Perhaps Rota should have given the usual stock responses to that sort of question, and that would have made the book better.  I doubt I would have been convinced, though.

Chapter 10, “Counterevidence: Divine Hiddenness and Evil,” was actually an effective chapter, as it discussed the problem of evil.  Rota addresses the question of whether the suffering that God permits is overkill, assuming God allows people to suffer to improve them morally and spiritually.  Rota essentially asks how we would quantify the appropriate amount of suffering: is any suffering too much?  That is not entirely convincing, but it is a thought-provoking response.  Rota’s discussion of Van Inwagen’s treatment of suffering was helpful: Inwagen rejected the idea that God is directly responsible for specific acts of suffering, but Inwagen believed that God permits a world in which suffering exists for educative purposes.  God does not directly cause a person’s illness for a specific reason that is tailored towards that person, in short, but God permits a world in which illness exists for a general purpose.  Rota’s discussion of Eleonore Stump’s interaction with the problem of evil had some edifying aspects, specifically Stump’s discussion of God’s concern about the spiritual and moral health of Cain and God’s attempts to reach out to him.  The prominence of hell in this discussion somewhat spoiled it for me, though.

Chapter 11, “Historical Evidence for Christianity: The Resurrection,” contained classical apologetic arguments for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.  An advantage to this chapter is that Rota interacts with challenges from detractors to such arguments, such as John Shelby Spong.  Rota places some emphasis on the claim that certain church fathers knew the apostles, as well as the Christian creed and appeal to eyewitnesses that Paul cites in I Corinthians 15:3-8.  Rota also stresses that Paul believed that the resurrection was bodily, which would be consistent with the Gospels’ presentation of an empty tomb, and would preclude the possibility that the idea of Jesus’ resurrection arose from a mere hallucination.  This chapter was all right, and yet I believe that questions can still be asked.  What, for example, would Rota do with the second century “Gnostic” Christian teachers who claimed to receive their teaching from someone who knew an apostle, or apostles?  While most New Testament scholars reject Robert M. Price’s view that the creed in I Corinthians 15:3-8 was a later interpolation, agreeing with Rota that it was an earlier creed that Paul received, Price, in my opinion, still asks valid questions: if an early creed—-the official creed that the church passed on to new initiates—-mentioned five-hundred witnesses to the risen Jesus, why does no later New Testament Gospel mention that specific appearance of Jesus?  And, even if Rota is correct on the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, does that necessarily prove that Christianity is the only divinely-authoritative religion, or that everything Jesus said and taught is true?  Are there other possibilities?  Could God authorize Christianity, while still revealing Godself in other religions, as well?  That brings to mind another criticism I have: Rota defends Christianity without really presenting arguments that other religions are wrong, or deficient.  That is significant, in light of the “other religions” argument against Pascal’s Wager.

Before I proceed to the biographical parts of Rota’s book, I want to make a comment about the apologetic element of Rota’s book.  It should have had more Pascal: more references to and interaction with Pascal’s thought!  Pascal, as Rota knows, did not just present Pascal’s Wager but offered other apologetic arguments, as well.  From Phil Fernandes’ 2004 article, “The Apologetic Methodology of Blaise Pascal” (http://www.leaderu.com/apologetics/pascalmethodology.html), I gather that some of Pascal’s arguments coincide with Rota’s approach, whereas others diverge from it.  Pascal was leery of the cosmological and teleological arguments, but he probably would have loved Rota’s moral and existential arguments and appeal to beauty.  Pascal also employed a historical argument for Christianity, so he overlaps with Rota on this, even though Rota’s arguments are more up-to-date from a scholarly standpoint.  Mentioning and interacting with Pascal’s apologetics would have made this book better.  Rota could have mentioned and briefly engaged Pascal’s problems with the cosmological and teleological arguments, before justifying his own appeal to them.  On historical arguments for Christianity, Rota could have offered a judgment about where Pascal’s historical argument fell short, and how recent scholarship can improve historical arguments for Christianity, or offer better arguments.

The following three chapters are biographical, as they discuss three figures who made a decision for God and found happiness as a result, notwithstanding significant challenges.  Chapter 13 is about Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  Rota talks about how Bonhoeffer in prison had a joyful, loving attitude, and Rota attributed that to Bonhoeffer’s faith.  To provide a more rounded portrait, however, Rota should have discussed the view that Bonhoeffer was a Christian atheist, and possible struggles that Bonhoeffer had.  This goes back to my critique of Chapter 3: What about Christians who struggle?

Chapter 14 was about Jean Vanier, who left a promising position in academia to work with the developmentally-delayed.  This chapter had beautiful things to say about the love that developmentally-delayed people can show, and how those who work with them can feel free to accept themselves in their presence.  This coincides with Pascal’s argument that serving God can bring blessings in this life.  The picture of working with the developmentally-delayed was rather one-sided, however, for that kind of work can also have its challenges.

Chapter 15 especially spoke to me.  It was about Immaculee Ilibagiza’s struggle to forgive, and the things that God told her to help her to forgive.  I have been criticizing this book for not acknowledging struggling Christians enough.  This chapter was an exception.

Notwithstanding my critiques, I give this book four stars.  Rota is an engaging and lucid author, and he wrestles with tough challenges.

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: A Little Book for New Philosophers, by Paul Copan

Paul Copan.  A Little Book for New Philosophers: Why and How to Study Philosophy.  Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2016.  See here to purchase the book.

Paul Copan teaches philosophy at Palm Beach Atlantic University.

As the subtitle of this book indicates, this book talks about the advantages of studying philosophy.  It seems to be aimed at people who wonder whether they should pursue philosophy as an academic study, perhaps for a career in academia.

The book thoughtfully explores a variety of subjects: the increasing acceptance of theism within philosophical circles, arguments for the existence of God, the existence of the soul, verificationism, similarities and differences between the God of the Bible and the philosophical God (i.e., the picture of God influenced by Greek philosophy), the question of whether atheists bear any burden of proof, and what to do with religious doubt.  Copan also defends the study of philosophy against Christians who regard it as antithetical to Christianity.  Not only does Copan offer an alternative interpretation of Bible verses that have been cited against philosophy, but he also effectively argues that Scripture itself, along with Christian minds throughout history, have encouraged the life of the mind.

Copan also offers a lay-of-the-land of academia, as he speaks from experience as an academic philosopher.  For Copan, Christian philosophers should exemplify the fruit of the Spirit in how they treat colleagues, including those with whom they disagree.  This may sound obvious, but Copan offers practical advice on how to be a Christian in academia: how to view one’s own work, how to help others, and how being in a group of Christian philosophers can be important.  Cohan also shares how he went through Coppleston’s series of books on philosophy, and that may be helpful to people who are seriously interested in the field, as well as people whose minds can easily wander when they are reading!

I would like to quote some of my favorite lines in the book, just to give you a taste:

“Practicing philosophy in the way of Jesus, for instance, requires that professors never publicly dismantle a graduate student’s paper at a conference” (page 81).

“So whether we publish much or little, whether our work is widely admired or falls stillborn from the press, we will be a faithful presence wherever God has placed us” (pages 82-83).

“My PhD advisor told me not to attempt anything earthshaking for my dissertation…He suggested I keep my nose to the grindstone, work hard and save any bold work for later” (pages 92-93).

And, as someone who wonders if James 1:6-8 condemns all doubt, I appreciated Cohan’s interpretation: “Actually, James is condemning a mindset of divided loyalty between God and the world—-a spiritual adultery” (page 103).

The book may help Christian students at secular universities to feel less alone when their Christianity is challenged.  This book demonstrates that intelligent people have embraced Christianity and have pursued careers in academia.

This book, by itself, may not provide Christian students with sufficient arguments to use against atheists and skeptics, who can easily respond with “Where’s the proof for God’s existence?”, dismiss some arguments as wishful thinking, or see some arguments as “God in the gaps” arguments.  Copan criticizes “God in the gaps” arguments as lazy, but he also seems to prefer theistic explanations because they at least attempt to account for things that puzzle naturalists.  Naturalists would probably see that approach itself as a “God in the gaps” approach, believing that we should not dismiss the possibility of a natural explanation just because one currently eludes us.  The book may still provide Christian students with a starting-point in addressing atheist and skeptical arguments.

A disappointment, in terms of the book, is that it did not really explore how Christians can be edified by philosophical insights.  Granted, it talked about how philosophy can sharpen one’s mind, but, when it came to philosophy, it largely focused on the questions of whether God and the soul exist.  Can philosophy do more than buttress what Christians already believe to be true?  Can it teach them anything new?  On pages 38-39, Copan refers positively to analytic theologians who “haven’t focused primarily on Christian apologetics or arguments for God’s existence…”  Copan’s book would have been better had its horizons been broader.

The book also had somewhat of a siege mentality, in places: Christians must try to protect their faith, and Christians should hang around their own.  I should stress, though, that, the opposite approach is in the book, too, as it encourages those interested in philosophy to learn the thoughts of major philosophical figures and to engage atheist and skeptical philosophers.  Copan also has reasons for holding the Christian faith, which include arguments, its explanatory power, its satisfaction of human longings, and the experiences of the supernatural by people he knows.  I doubt that Copan is insecure in his faith.  It just seems that he is for exploration, but he wants it to arrive at Christian conclusions.  Of course, there are atheists and skeptics who are the same way, with their own worldviews, but is there a way to be open-minded while holding a particular worldview, as opposed to being in a no-man’s land?

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: The Gospel on the Margins, by Michael J. Kok

Michael J. Kok.  The Gospel on the Margins: The Reception of Mark in the Second Century.  Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015.  See here to purchase the book.

The second century figure, Papias, has been significant in scholarly, apologetic, and counter-apologetic discussions about the historical reliability of the biblical Gospels.  Eusebius (fourth century C.E.), in Ecclesiastical History 3.39, states that Papias received information from eyewitnesses to the apostles.  According to Eusebius, Papias heard from John the Elder that the Gospel of Mark was based on the testimony of the apostle Peter.  Many Christian apologists and conservative scholars have argued, on the basis of Papias, that the Gospel of Mark reflects eyewitness testimony to Jesus Christ, which enhances its reliability as a historical document.

Michael J. Kok, in The Gospel on the Margins, evaluates these claims, and he also aims to address a perplexing puzzle: considering that the Gospel of Mark was believed to reflect the eyewitness testimony of Peter, why was it such a marginal Gospel, one that was rarely cited in patristic sources?  Would not one expect a Gospel thought to be based on the testimony of such a high-ranking apostle as Peter to be more popular and widely-used?

While scholars have debated the reliability of Papias and what Papias says about the Gospel of Mark, Kok explores a topic that he believes has been neglected in such discussions: the “ideological function” of the patristic traditions about the Gospel of Mark “in Mark’s reception history” (page 9, Adobe Digital Edition).
For Kok, the attribution of the Gospel of Mark to Mark, as well as the claim that the Gospel of Mark contained Peter’s eyewitness testimony, served an ideological purpose in second century Christian debates.

In the Introduction, Kok offers evidence that the Gospel of Mark was marginal in terms of second century patristic interaction with it.  Kok also briefly mentions a scholarly debate about Papias’ statement about the Gospel of Mark: was Papias correct on this, or did Papias spin “the whole tale out of an erroneous inference from 1 Peter 5:13,” which presents Mark as a close associate of Peter?  I Peter 5:13 will be significant in Kok’s overall discussion.  Kok also refers to a difference of opinion between Papias and Augustine: Papias regarded Mark as a preserver of Peter’s testimony, whereas Augustine viewed Mark merely as one who abbreviated Matthew’s Gospel.  This difference of opinion highlights the tensions that Kok will explore.  On the one hand, Mark’s Gospel was regarded as significant enough to include in the canon.  On the other hand, Mark’s Gospel was marginal and often overshadowed by the Gospel of Matthew, which has a lot of what Mark’s Gospel has, and more.

Chapter 1, “The Decline of the Patristic Consensus,” interacts with twentieth-century scholars who disputed that the Gospel of Mark was by John Mark, the one who knew apostles.  In turn, they also disputed that the Gospel of Mark contained Peter’s testimony.  To quote from page 33, Kok engages “the form critical replacement of Peter with the anonymous community (Dennis Nineham), the redaction or narrative critical portrayals of Peter as a villain in Mark’s drama (Theodore Weeden, Richard Horsley), and the historical critical objections to the authorship of the second canonical Gospel by a first-century Palestinian Jew (Kurt Niederwimmer, Pierson Parker).”  Kok weighs these objections and identifies what he believes are their strengths and weaknesses, but he does not think that they by themselves successfully exclude the possibility that Peter played some role in the Gospel of Mark’s content.  Kok also concludes that a first century Palestinian Jew could have written the Gospel of Mark.  One interesting question with which Kok wrestles in this chapter is this: Why would Jesus in Mark 7 criticize some of the Pharisees for violating the Torah, only to go on and nullify the Torah’s dietary laws?

In Chapter 2, “The Re-Emergence of the Patristic Tradition,” Kok engages scholars who maintain that Papias is reliable in what Papias says about the Gospel of Mark.  These scholars include Robert Gundry, Martin Hengel, Samuel Byrskog, Richard Bauckham, and Michael Bird.  It is in this chapter that Kok offers his own view on the reliability of Papias, and his conclusion is that Papias is rather wanting in terms of reliability.  Kok agrees with Eusebius that Papias is drawing from John the Elder rather than John the apostle (whereas Irenaeus equated the two), and Kok calls John the Elder “elusive.”  Kok doubts that John the Elder was an eyewitness to Jesus, since “the likelihood of [a personal student] of Jesus living into the second century is low” (page 82).  Kok also contends that Papias may have been naive and uncritical in his acceptance of traditions.  Also in this chapter, Kok evaluates whether the Gospel of Mark contains Peter’s testimony.  Kok is doubtful of this, one reason being that the Gospel of Mark is highly critical of the apostles.  Kok engages the question of whether the Gospel of Mark could have been written by someone associated with Paul, a Paulinist, and, while Kok believes some arguments for this have merit, he ultimately concludes that Paul and the Gospel of Mark are too different in terms of their ideologies, emphases, and themes.  For Kok, the author of the Gospel of Mark was probably a late first century Jew (writing for Jewish and Gentile Christians) who was alienated from the political and religious establishment and was hoping for the return of the Son of Man, and he encouraged his fellow Christians to suffer faithfully.  According to Kok, this Gospel was anonymous to highlight the importance of its message rather than its author.

In Chapter 3, “From Paul’s Fellow Worker to Peter’s Interpreter,” Kok offers one model for how the Gospel of Mark came to be attributed to Mark, and, in turn, to Peter.  According to Kok, Mark in parts of the New Testament is presented as a companion to Paul, but Mark comes to be associated with Peter, too (Acts 12:5; I Peter 5:13), in an attempt to present a centrist Christianity and to bring together different factions.  I Peter 5:13 was influential in Asia Minor, where John the Elder, the man who influenced Papias, was.  Kok believes that the Papian prologues influenced Luke-Acts rather than vice-versa, and that Luke-Acts itself may refer to the idea that Mark wrote the Gospel of Mark.  Kok thinks that Acts 13:5 may present John Mark as a repository of Christian tradition for Paul, who was not himself an eyewitness to the historical Jesus, and that the negative portrayal of Mark in Acts may serve to uphold Luke’s “orderly” Gospel at the expense of the Gospel of Mark.  Also noteworthy in this chapter is that Kok addresses the argument that Mark wrote the Gospel of Mark, for why would church fathers attribute the Gospel of Mark to an insignificant person such as Mark, unless Mark actually wrote it?  If the church fathers wanted to attach a name to a Gospel, why not the name of an actual apostle, such as Peter?  Kok notes that “apocryphal Gospels were attributed to all sorts of names, apostolic or not, such as Thomas, Matthias, Mary, Bartholomew, Nicodemus, or Gamaliel” (page 143).  Kok goes on to say that “‘Mark’ may have been an ideal candidate as a figure of some repute via his association with the apostles and as an intermediary who could bear the blame for the shortcomings of the Gospel instead of Peter himself.”  Another topic that Kok explores in this chapter is how Papias’ view on the Gospel of Mark influenced Justin Martyr (second century C.E.), Irenaeus (second century C.E.), and Clement of Alexandria (second century C.E.).

In Chapter 4, “Toward a Theory of the Patristic Reception of Mark,” Kok sets the stage to address possible ideological reasons that the Gospel of Mark was attributed to Mark, and, in turn, to Peter.  In the second century, there were debates within Christianity.  Both the factions that became “orthodox” and the factions later deemed “heretical” claimed apostolic succession and attributed their Gospels to apostles, as a way to buttress their own authority and claims to possess authentic Christianity.  Kok raises the question of whether the same thing that happened to the Gospel of John happened to the Gospel of Mark.  According to Kok, there was some avoidance of the Gospel of John in the second century, as the “orthodox” noted that the “heretics” used it; some even disputed that John wrote it, attributing it instead to Cerinthus.  Yet, the “orthodox” came to co-opt the Gospel of John, as it reinforced their belief that Jesus pre-existed and was God.  Could Mark’s Gospel, likewise, have been co-opted by the “orthodox,” after being used by “heretics”?

In Chapter 5, “The Gospel on the Margins of the Canon,” Kok narrates how Papias, Irenaeus, and Clement essentially apologize for the Gospel of Mark, offering different traditions on the Gospel’s relationship with Peter.  They want to uphold the Gospel of Mark as somehow related to Peter, but they also want to distance Peter from the Gospel of Mark’s apparent deficiencies.  According to Kok, Papias’ problem with the Gospel of Mark was its lack of literary refinement and its dearth of important details about Jesus’ life, such as Jesus’ birth.  Papias says that Peter relayed details to Mark, but blames Mark for the Gospel of Mark’s deficiencies.  Irenaeus’ solution was that Mark wrote after Peter died.  Clement (as discussed by Eusebius) offered other possibilities, one being that Peter was still alive when Mark wrote the Gospel, but was indifferent as Mark released the Gospel to a limited circle of Christian leaders, perhaps as unrefined notes.  Also in this chapter, Kok disputes that the Gospel of Mark was used in an Alexandrian baptismal lectionary.

Chapter 6, “The Clash of Rival Interpreters,” concerns the theological and religious problems that the “orthodox” had with the Gospel of Mark, or its usage by “heretics.”  Adoptionists appealed to the Gospel of Mark to argue that the divine possessed the man Jesus at Jesus’ baptism and later left Jesus at the passion.  Clement was concerned about how the Gospel of Mark was used by ascetics to encourage people to give up all their wealth, as Jesus told the rich young ruler; Clement had a more moderate stance on how Christians should perceive wealth.  Kok argues that the “orthodox” (my term, not Kok’s) co-opted the Gospel of Mark because it “was too dangerous to be left in the wrong hands” (page 322).  They attributed it to Mark, and in turn, to Peter, as a way to legitimize its usage in Christian churches, while controlling how it was used.  Yet, the Gospel of Mark “hardly captured their excitement” and was thus marginal (page 338).

An Appendix, “The Carpocratians and the Mystic Gospel of Mark,” concerns the controversial Mystic Gospel of Mark.  Kok disputes that the Mystic Gospel of Mark was a forgery by the twentieth century scholar Morton Smith, and Kok also disagrees with the idea that the Mystic Gospel existed prior to the Gospel of Mark.  For Kok, the Mystic Gospel of Mark is an example of how a group of second century Christians deemed heretical (by the “orthodox”) used Mark and Mark’s Gospel for their own purposes, while promoting the asceticism that Clement criticized.  Interestingly, the Mystic Gospel of Mark may be an attempt to continue the story of the rich young ruler who turned Jesus down in Mark 10 out of love for his own possessions: either the ruler in Mystic Mark later converted and gave up his possessions (which seems to be Robert Grant’s view), or another rich person gave up his possessions, after Jesus was disappointed that the first rich person failed to do so (Kok’s view on Mystic Mark).

This book has a lot of assets.  It interacts with scholarly views and addresses different patristic traditions.  Those interested in what scholars have said about Papias will find this book a valuable resource.  The book was often a maze and required intense concentration to follow Kok’s engagement with different scholarly ideas, but Kok did well to offer a lucid summary of his arguments and conclusions at the end of each chapter.

In terms of Kok’s argument, his models are possible.  They may be speculative, on some level, but they do incorporate plausible details.  His belief that I Peter 5:13 attempts to bring together different factions and appeals to Mark to do so is rather speculative.  Yet, one can make a plausible case that there were differences in early Christianity about Gentiles and the Torah among key figures (Paul and James, or James’ party; see Galatians 2), and that Acts seems to be a later attempt to present Peter, Paul, and James as united rather than divided on this issue, and others.  Could the depiction of Mark play a role in this development?  Moreover, Kok never definitively proves that the “orthodox” Christians attributed the Gospel of Mark to Mark, and, in turn, to Peter to score points in controversies, but he does present an effective case that there was concern about the Gospel of Mark in the second century.

In terms of slight critiques, I have a problem with how Kok presents John the Elder as somewhat of a nobody (which may be an extreme characterization of Kok’s view, on my part, but it was the impression that I got).  Why would Papias value what John the Elder had to say, if that were the case?  Also, I was puzzled about how paleographic experts could date a copy of the Mystic Gospel of Mark to the eighteenth century.  Kok dates it to the second century, whereas those who see it as a forgery by Morton Smith would presumably date it to the twentieth century.  How does the conclusion of the paleographic experts fit into all that?  Kok should have addressed that, at least to clear up misunderstandings that some readers (like yours truly) might have.

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher through Edelweiss.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: The Resurrection of Jesus, by Michael R. Licona

Michael R. Licona.  The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach.  Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2010.  See here to purchase the book.

Michael R. Licona has a Ph.D. from the University of Pretoria and has taught at Houston Baptist Seminary.  He is a New Testament scholar, and he is also considered to be a Christian apologist, though (as we shall see) his claims in this book are more modest than those of many Christian apologists.  Still, in The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, Licona defends the historicity of Jesus’ bodily resurrection.

One page 583, Licona defines the Resurrection Hypothesis that he supports: “Following a supernatural event of an indeterminate nature and cause, Jesus appeared to a number of people, in individual and group settings and to friends and foes, in no less than an objective vision and perhaps within ordinary vision in his bodily raised corpse.”

In Chapter 1, “Important Considerations on Historical Inquiry Pertaining to the Truth in Ancient Texts,” Licona discusses questions of historiography, which largely focus on the challenges to recovering and accurately representing the past.  Licona describes and appreciates such challenges.  The approach that he adopts is critical realism, so he is critical of postmodern challenges to the historical enterprise and maintains that historians can make tentative, plausible judgments about what happened in history.  Licona’s approach is also methodically neutral, which means that it expects historical texts (i.e., sources consulted to help reconstruct the past, such as primary sources) and historians’ hypotheses to bear the “burden of proof” regarding their claims and usefulness in the historical enterprise.  Considerations in this “burden of proof” include evidence, argumentation, plausibility, explanatory scope, explanatory power, being less ad hoc, and illumination (and these are Licona’s terms).  At the end of the chapter, Licona offers “confessions” about his own beliefs, biases, and situation.  Two parts of this that stood out was (1.) when Licona said that “there have been times when I have been desirous of a nonspecific form of theism” (page 139) (rather than a specifically Christian form, I am assuming), and (2.) when Licona said that “should my research lead me to the conclusion that Jesus did not rise from the dead I would be dismissed from my position and my employment would be terminated.”  I do respect Licona’s honesty.

In Chapter 2, “The Historian and Miracles,” Licona argues against the belief that miracles should be dismissed as a possibility when historians are attempting to recover and convey the past.  For Licona, miracles that pass the muster of historical method should be accepted as an explanation.  Licona would apply this criteria to non-Christian miracles, as well, but, overall, he believes that Jesus’ miracles and resurrection pass the historical criteria in a way that non-Christian miracles do not.  Later in the book, Licona expresses some openness to the Marian apparitions being supernatural, yet he refers to a view that these are demonic.

Chapter 3 is about the “Historical Sources Pertaining to the Resurrection of Jesus.”  In this chapter, Licona evaluates historical sources, both Christian and non-Christian, as to whether they are helpful in enabling historians to draw conclusions about the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.  Licona rates the canonical Gospels, Josephus’ references to Jesus, and Tacitus (to cite examples, as Licona considers other sources as well) as “possible” in terms of their usefulness, but he prefers Paul and the sources that Paul quotes because they are closer to the time of Jesus, plus Paul “knew the major Jerusalem apostles” (page 209).

Chapter 4 is about “The Historical Bedrock Pertaining to the Fate of Jesus.”  This historical bedrock includes three claims.  The first claim is that “Jesus died by crucifixion.”  The second claim is that “Very shortly after Jesus’ death, the disciples had experiences that led them to believe that Jesus had been resurrected and had appeared to them.”  The third is that “Within a few years after Jesus’ death, Paul converted after experiencing what he interpreted as a postresurrection appearance of Jesus to him.”  Licona states that these claims are accepted by a large majority of biblical scholars, of different faith commitments (including no religious commitments).  Licona does the historical work of supporting these claims, often by using the criteria that have conventionally been employed in scholarly attempts to identify what is historically accurate and what is historically inaccurate in the biblical Gospels.  Such criteria include the criterion of multiple attestation (i.e., a detail is probably historical because it appears in multiple sources), and the criterion of embarrassment (i.e., early Christians would not invent something that would embarrass them, so an embarrassing detail is likely historical).  Licona evaluates other claims, as well: did Jesus predict his resurrection, did Jesus perform miracles, did Jesus’ brother James convert to Christianity after doubting Jesus, and are the empty tomb stories in the Gospels historically reliable?  Licona believes that there are legitimate reasons to answer “yes” to all of these questions, but he ultimately excludes these from the historical bedrock, one reason being that they are not broadly accepted within biblical scholarship, as least not to the extent that the bedrock is.

Licona in this chapter extensively discusses Paul’s view of Jesus’ resurrection.  For Licona, Paul believed that Jesus rose bodily from the dead: that Jesus’ corpse was transformed into a glorious, albeit physical, body.  This is consistent with what the canonical Gospels present, including the empty tomb.  Licona argues against scholarly ideas that draw a wedge between Paul and the Gospels, by saying that Paul believed Jesus had a spiritual body rather than a physical body, or by positing that the early Christians could say that Jesus rose while acknowledging that Jesus’ corpse was still in the ground decaying.  Licona rejects the idea that the disciples saw a mere vision or hallucination, for he thinks that they objectively saw the risen body of Jesus.  For Licona, this was the view of Paul and Paul’s sources (including the creed in I Corinthians 15:3-7, which mentions five-hundred witnesses to the risen Jesus), which have high historical probability.

Chapter 5 is entitled “Weighing Hypothesis.”  In this chapter, Licona weighs scholarly attempts to account for the historical bedrock that he described in Chapter 4.  Licona looks at the work of Geza Vermes, Michael Goulder, Gerd Ludemann, John Dominic Crossan, and Pieter F. Craffert.  In an appendix, Licona evaluates the work of Dale Allison.  Many of these scholars attempt to account for early Christian belief in Jesus’ resurrection from a naturalistic perspective, without any recourse to the supernatural.  Some say, for instance, that the early Christians saw hallucinations, and this is how they concluded that Jesus rose from the dead.  Licona rejects this explanation because he does not believe in group hallucinations, since a hallucination can only be in one person’s head.  Licona also rejects these scholars’ models because he thinks that they are lacking in evidence: for Licona, an acceptable hypothesis cannot merely ask “What if?” and poke holes in the Resurrection Hypothesis but must itself must have evidential support and be able to account for and explain the data.  Licona does not completely fail these competing hypotheses, for he gives them a passing grade in some areas and a failing grade in others.  Still, he believes that the Resurrection Hypothesis is the best explanation for the data and early Christian belief in the resurrection.

In terms of positives, this book was thorough, overall, in weighing different scholarly views.  To his credit, Licona was not shackled by Christian fundamentalism or a belief in biblical inerrancy, which is why this book was so controversial.  Although Licona is an apologist, he said that one did not necessarily have to believe that the biblical God was the one who raised Jesus from the dead to accept the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.  Licona differs from Christian apologists who argue that Jesus rose, then smuggle into that the conclusion that biblical inerrancy is therefore true, or that the entire Christian worldview is true.  Licona also manifests some open-mindedness on there being a belief in dying-and-rising gods prior to Jesus.  Licona rejects the notion that these influenced the development of Christianity, but he still thinks that dying-and-rising gods is a topic for scholars to explore further.  Another asset is that there were occasions when Licona offered a fresh interpretation of Scripture.  Why does the Gospel of Mark end by saying that the women did not tell anyone about Jesus’ resurrection, noting their fear?  Licona interprets this in light of Mark 1:44, in which Jesus instructs a leper he cleanses to say nothing to anyone, but to go to the priest to perform the proper rituals.  For Licona, the women’s silence in Mark’s Gospel was temporary, and their fear was reverent awe.  Licona was also informative about ancient historiography, acknowledging that it could embellish or exaggerate, or contain contradictions.

I enjoy reading atheist biblical scholar Robert Price, and Price argues that the creed in I Corinthians 15:3-7 was a later interpolation and thus lacks historical value in supporting the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.  Licona does not directly refute this argument (though he engages Price in the footnotes), but Licona did argue that there are verbal indications in the remainder of I Corinthians 15 that Paul adapted his vocabulary in response to the creed.  That would weigh against the creed being a later interpolation.

In terms of negatives, there were topics that Licona should have explored further.  Licona mentions instances in the New Testament in which resurrection bodies shine like the sun, but he failed to explain how that can be reconciled with Jesus’ resurrection body being physical.  (On one occasion, he mentions II Baruch 21:33 and 30:2-5, which posit a physical resurrection preceding a glorified, shining body, but Licona was not addressing there the resurrection body of Jesus.)  Licona did well to offer an interpretation of I Corinthians 15:45, which calls the risen Jesus a spirit, but (as far as I recall) Licona did not address Paul’s reference to the different kinds of flesh in I Corinthians 15:39-41; this is significant because it pertains to whether Paul is saying Jesus had a different, spiritual kind of bodily composition, which Licona (at least somewhat) disputes.  Licona offers a fairly effective argument that the soma pneumatikon of I Corinthians 15 was not an ethereal or spiritual body lacking physicality, as he looks at the usage of the term in other ancient sources.  While he cited the sources, however, he failed to say what exactly those sources were saying a soma pneumatikon is.

Licona in Chapter 3 is very critical in his acceptance of sources.  He appears to take off the table the canonical Gospels and Tacitus, for instance.  Later in the book, however, he appeals to these sources as authorities when evaluating the historicity of the “historical bedrock,” as he uses the multiple attestation criterion.  On page 509, Licona argues against John Dominic Crossan’s comparison of the five-hundred witnesses to the risen Jesus in I Corinthians 15:3-7 to a (alleged) collective delusion of St. George during the Crusades.  Licona states that the disciples’ condition differed from that of the Crusaders, for the Crusaders were poised and ready to see such a delusion, whereas the disciples “were already in hiding and could have walked away accepting their losses, intent on finding another messiah or finding something else to do with their lives.”  How does Licona know that about the disciples, though?  Is he presuming the historicity of the Gospel accounts?

Licona does offer defenses for the reliability of the Gospel narratives on Jesus’ resurrection, even though he takes them off the table as evidence, on some level.  Many of his arguments will be familiar to those who have read Christian apologetics (i.e., the Gospel narratives are reliable because they present women as the first witnesses to the empty tomb, and women’s testimony was considered suspect in that day).  Some were new to me: If the Gospels invented the resurrection stories to portray Jesus’ resurrection as physical and to counter docetism, why did they portray Jesus’ resurrected body vanishing into thin air?  They would be shooting themselves in the foot, if refuting docetism were their agenda, right?  That was an effective argument, on Licona’s part.  Where Licona left me scratching my head, however, was when he was defending the Gospels by comparing them to other ancient sources.  The Gospels contradict themselves?  So do ancient sources that many historians accept as historical!  The Gospels are later than the time that they depict?  So are other ancient sources, yet historians deem them to be historically reliable.  In these cases, Licona should have explained why historians accept those ancient sources as historically reliable, notwithstanding their weaknesses.

Licona also should have taken a moment to explain why the criteria of authenticity can shed light on the past.  Nowadays, the criteria are becoming a bit outdated, or outmoded.  Since Licona used them, he should have explained their usefulness, perhaps in the chapter on historiography.

Licona was also a little too hard on the competing hypotheses, in my opinion.  He dismissed some of them as lacking any evidence.  Maybe they are limited as full-fledged explanatory hypotheses, but they still have valid insights.  One view was that Paul deep down was struggling with the law as a Pharisee and had a love hate-relationship with Christianity, and that could account for his vision of Christ and his conversion.  Licona dismisses this as historical psycho-analyzing.  But did not Jesus tell Saul that Saul was kicking against the goads (Acts 26:14)?  Does not Paul struggle with the law in Romans 7, and elsewhere in his epistles?  Why are these irrelevant in accounting for the bedrock?

I received a complimentary copy of this book from IVP Academic.  My review is honest!

Book Write-Up: The Touchpoint, by Bob Santos

Bob Santos.  The Touchpoint: Connecting with God Through the Bible.  Indiana, PA: Search for Me Ministries, Inc., 2016.  See here to purchase the book.

I read and reviewed Bob Santos’ The Divine Progression of Grace over a year ago and found it to be a thoughtful and edifying book.  When I learned about Santos’ new book, The Touchpoint, I wanted to read it.

The Touchpoint is essentially about the Bible.  Why is the Bible important for the Christian life?  How can believers have confidence that the Bible is credible?  How can Christians read and study the Bible, and make time to do so?  In the course of these discussions, Santos addresses hot-button issues, such as whether the Bible is inerrant, the historicity of the creation accounts in Genesis 1-2, and Christian abuses of Scripture.

The things that I liked about The Divine Progression of Grace are the things that I like about The Touchpoint.  Santos is honest about his personal and spiritual journey.  The Touchpoint seemed to have even more personal anecdotes than The Divine Progression of Grace, and this humanized Santos and enabled him to make a connection with me as a reader.  The prose of the book was easy to understand, and yet it was not the sort of book that I could binge read.  I read fifty pages a day and let that digest, for the book was rich and weighty.  And, overall, Santos attempts to be fair and balanced towards different perspective and to understand people’s struggles and challenges when it comes to making time and effort to study the Bible.

There were passages in the book that I especially appreciated.  I could identify with Santos’ statement that he was a good student but that he struggled in making life decisions, and that this was why he relied on God and the Bible.  On page 247, Santos said that he has to prove himself in his vocation by working “at speaking with meaning and clarity,” but “when it comes to my personal identity, I don’t need to prove anything to anybody,” for “My ‘work’ is simply to believe.”  Santos’ use of the analogy of skin and bones to highlight the roles of objective truth and subjective experience in the Christian life was effective, and his discussion of how the Gospel humbles peoples so that they will have humility in heaven was illuminating.

There was one area in which Santos’ point provoked a new insight within me, even though that new insight may go beyond what Santos intended.  I have long been skeptical of Christians who claim that they receive their interpretation of Scripture from the Holy Spirit.  In my opinion, such a stance implies that their interpretation has a certitude that it actually lacks.  Plus, some of these interpretations contradict each other, so do we want to say that God gives contradictory interpretations of Scripture?  Santos himself contends that people should ask God for guidance when reading Scripture, for spiritual truths are spiritually ascertained.  At the same time, Santos states that people should ask God to help them see what God wants them to see, to learn what God wants them to learn.  That, in my mind, is different from the notion that God gives believers divinely-sanctioned interpretations of Scripture.  God can guide people and use the Bible and other media to do so, even if God does not provide people with the final, unassailable interpretation of a biblical verse.

In terms of critiques, Santos at times seemed to contradict himself, sometimes in his attempts to balance out certain perspectives.  He proposed that the contradictions between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 may indicate that the creation accounts were not intended to be scientific, yet later he treats Adam and Eve as historical figures, although many scientists dispute that all of humanity descended from two people who lived six thousand years ago.  In one place, Santos said that fulfilled prophecy attests to the truth of the Bible, and he trotted out the usual texts in the Hebrew Bible that many Christians believe predict Jesus.  I wondered if Santos was aware that these passages appear to mean something different in their original contexts.  He later indicated that he was aware of this issue, for he said that Christians should not necessarily approach the Old Testament as the New Testament authors did.  Such contradictions did leave an unevenness in the book; at the same time, Santos may have been attempting to offer food for thought rather than giving the final comprehensive answer to these complex questions.

Overall, the apologetics parts of the book were all right, albeit subject to critique.  There was a lot of emphasis in the book on text criticism, but Santos did not really engage Bart Ehrman, who argues that ancient Christians did alter New Testament texts to accord with their religious views.  Santos was rather dismissive of higher critics, when their insights demonstrate that there is another side to the story besides what Santos presents.  Santos provided an actual argument that the creed in I Corinthians 15:3-7 originated within a decade after the death of Jesus, whereas many apologists simply assert that.  Santos’ reference to Sir William Ramsay, who in the nineteenth century converted from being a skeptic about the Book of Acts to accepting its historicity, was intriguing.

In my opinion, Santos’ personal or anecdotal arguments for Christianity were more appealing than his apologetic arguments.  Santos contends that people are looking for love, hope, and something to believe in, and he believes that the God of the Bible can meet these needs.  Santos also states that he has seen the life-transforming power of God in his own and other people’s lives.

This book is not comprehensive, but it is a Christian man sharing his experiences and insights in studying the Bible.  Seeing how another person does this can be helpful.

I received a complimentary review copy of this book from the publisher through Bookcrash, in exchange for an honest review.

Book Write-Up: A Doubter's Guide to the Ten Commandments

John Dickson.  A Doubter’s Guide to the Ten Commandments: How, For Better or Worse, Our Ideas About the Good Life Come from Moses and Jesus.  Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016.  See here to buy the book.

John Dickson has a Ph.D. in Ancient History from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia.  In A Doubter’s Guide to the Ten Commandments, Dickson comments on each of the ten commandments.  Although Dickson in his comments shares his knowledge of ancient history with readers and refers them to scholarly books, this book is popular rather than scholarly.

Here are some of my comments on the book:

A. Narrowing down Dickson’s approach to the commandments is difficult, for Dickson does a variety of things throughout the book.  On some commandments, he refers to what the commandments may have meant in light of their ancient Near Eastern context.  In other chapters, by contrast, that sort of analysis was sorely lacking, and Dickson focused instead on philosophical issues (i.e., is God necessary for morality to exist?) or how Judaism and Christianity compare with other world religions.  Both of these issues are relevant to contemporary debates between Christians and atheists.  Parts of the book are rather homiletical, as Dickson quotes such thinkers as C.S. Lewis and John Calvin.  Throughout the book, Dickson discusses the significance of the commandments in the New Testament: how the New Testament interprets, applies, or amplifies the commandments.

The book had a lot of asides and was somewhat meandering.  In some cases, Dickson seemed contradictory, as when he was addressing the question of whether God in the Old Testament blessed people materially as a reward for good behavior and whether that affirmed the prosperity Gospel.  Dickson is against the prosperity Gospel, but he was rather contradictory on material blessings in the Old Testament.  There were also occasions when his point was a bit unclear.  He says more than once that what has influenced Western civilization for the better has been the commandments as they have been interpreted in Christianity, rather than Judaism or their original meaning.  What exactly Dickson’s point was in making that statement is difficult to determine.  Was this his justification for looking at what the New Testament said about the commandments?  Was he somehow marginalizing what the commandments meant in their ancient Near Eastern context or Judaism?  But Dickson does discuss what they meant within those contexts, often positively!  Even the subtitle of the book is confusing: “How, For Better or Worse, Our Ideas About the Good Life Come From Moses and Jesus.”  Better or worse?  Dickson argues consistently that the ten commandments made a positive contribution to Western civilization.  Where’s this “worse” come from?

Part of the book’s charm is in its thoughtful, informed, and honest meanderings.  Still, perhaps the book could have been better organized, with more consideration of the commandments’ ancient Near Eastern context and their place in biblical religion.  In each chapter on the commandments, Dickson could have had sections on what a commandment meant in its original context, how Judaism and Christianity interpreted it, and that commandment’s relevance to today.

B.  Dickson’s overall approach is to see biblical religion as different from, and superior to, other religions.  It is interesting how Christian apologists take different approaches in their comparison of biblical religions with other religions, and the point that they believe their comparison is making.  Dickson stresses the contrasts: he contrasts the Sabbath commandment with ancient views on rest and work, the biblical God with pagan gods, and Christian attitudes on charity with pagan attitudes.  He regards biblical religion as distinct, superior, and revolutionary.  Yet, there are other Christian apologists, such as David Marshall, who look at similarities between Christianity and other religions and imply that this shows God is revealing Godself to humanity, cross-culturally.  (Marshall also makes contrasts and believes that biblical religion is revolutionary.)  Do the biblical religion’s differences from other religions attest to its truth, or are its similarities with other religions what demonstrate the truth of what it is saying?  Such a discussion would be interesting!

The points that Dickson makes are certainly relevant and important to consider.  There may be truth in a lot of what he says about the differences between biblical religion and other religions.  At the same time, one should remember that there are other perspectives on this issue, and that these other perspectives, too, may be referring to details that are true, or that are part of the picture.  Atheist biblical scholar Hector Avalos recently quoted on John Loftus’ “Debunking Christianity” blog a statement by Christian scholar John Goldingday.  This statement appears on pages 42-43 of Goldingday’s book, Do We Still Need the New Testament?:

“What difference did Jesus’ coming make to the world? It has been argued that ‘The Church has made more changes on earth for good than any other movements of force in history,’
including the growth of hospitals, universities, literacy and education, capitalism and free enterprise, representative government, separation of political powers, civil liberty, the abolition of slavery, modern science, the discovery of the Americas, the elevation of women, the civilizing of primitive cultures, and the setting of languages to writing.

“It is easy to dispute this claim. The church resisted some of these developments just listed, some are not particularly Christian, and all were encouraged by humanistic forces and reflect Greek thinking as much as gospel thinking.”

There are passages in Greco-Roman literature that depict Zeus as just and compassionate.  Hospitality was an honored value in the Greco-Roman world, which is why Josephus tried to present Judaism as a compassionate religion to his Roman audience.  Morton Smith, in his article “Common Theology of the Ancient Near East,” which appeared in the Journal of Biblical Literature 71 (1952) 135-147, argued that the ancient Israelites resembled other ancient Near Eastern societies in their belief in a god who was just and compassionate.

This is not to suggest that Dickson should repudiate his viewpoint.  This book would have been better, however, had he thoughtfully wrestled with the other side, as he thoughtfully engages perspectives throughout the book.

C.  There are times when Dickson makes claims without telling the reader the source for his claims.  When he does document his claims, however, he is very helpful.  When Dickson contrasts Christian attitudes on charity with pagan attitudes, he refers readers to a scholarly book on the subject.  When Dickson contrasts Jesus’ stance on vows with Jewish stances, Dickson refers readers to specific passages in the Mishnah about vows that are not binding.

D.  The book is informative.  Dickson’s interpretation of the Sabbath commandment in light of ancient conceptions of work is noteworthy.  Dickson also refers to a medieval Christian concept that a poor person who steals to feed his family is technically not stealing, since the poor person is entitled to provision.  Dickson probably does not say this to recommend such behavior, but rather to show that the commandment against stealing is about more than what’s yours is yours, and what’s mine is mine.

E.  Reading the Sermon on the Mount can be difficult.  When Jesus tells us to reconcile with our brother who has something against us before we offer our gift to God (Matthew 5:24), does that mean we have to make everyone like us, before we can worship God?  But Jesus offended people!  When Jesus says that those who lust after women are adulterers at heart (Matthew 5:27-32), does Jesus forbid men to have a natural sex drive?  And is Jesus really equating hate with murder and lust with adultery?  When I told a secular therapist that, she was baffled: of course, she thought that actual murder was worse than hating someone!

An asset to this book is that Dickson engages these questions.  In some cases, he merely makes assertions.  In other cases, he offers an argument for his interpretation, as he does regarding Matthew 5:27-32.  His sensitivity to these issues was impressive.  His interpretations are reasonable, yet they maintain the challenge of the Sermon on the Mount.

F.  There were discussions in Dickson’s book that were inspiring and edifying.  A discussion that particularly comes to mind concerns how Christians can love everybody, while still maintaining high standards about what is right and wrong.  Humility about one’s own shortcomings plays a key role in that, according to Dickson.
This is a good book, and I am definitely open to reading other books by Dickson.

I received a complimentary review copy of this book from BookLook Bloggers, in exchange for an honest review.