I listened to another Nick Peters’ podcast last night. This one was
from November 2, 2013. It was with David Wood, and it concerned the
problem of evil: the question of whether the existence of evil is
compatible with the existence of an omnipotent, benevolent God. Does
the existence of evil mean that an omnipotent, benevolent God does not
exist?
See here to listen to the podcast.
Here are some thoughts:
A. I first heard about David Wood when I read Nabeel Qureshi’s Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus (for my review of that book, see here).
Not only was David Wood a significant character in Qureshi’s personal
story, but so were Christian apologists Gary Habermas and Mike Licona
(the latter is Peters’ father-in-law). To be honest, I did not care for
them that much when I read about them in Qureshi’s book. They just
seemed to me to be smug, overly self-assured about their beliefs, and
arrogant.
I have come to like them a lot more, however, after listening to them
in online interviews, and the reason is that they come across as much
humbler than they do in Qureshi’s book: they are sharing their personal
journeys, and they appear (to me at least) to understand why people
might object to certain Christian apologetic spiels. In a recent episode of the British radio program Unbelievable,
Gary Habermas was talking with skeptical scholar James Crossley about
Jesus’ resurrection, and Habermas said that, while he includes the early
Christians’ visions of the risen Jesus in the minimal list of things
that the vast majority of New Testament scholars agree are historical,
he does not include the empty tomb traditions in that list. (If only
William Lane Craig showed that same humility in his debates!) In
Lotharlorraine’s interview
with Mike Licona, Licona acknowledged that there are other ways to
account for the empty tomb and Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances
besides saying that Christianity is true; one could say that space
aliens did it (and yet Licona does not believe that is the best
explanation). And, in the podcast that I heard last night, David Wood
was saying that he does not find every theodicy he has heard convincing,
and that he is aware that some may not believe that free will is a good
enough reason for God to permit moral evil. When Christian apologists
acknowledge difficulties and qualify their positions, I tend to be more
open to what they have to say—-maybe because that sort of approach makes
them look more open or smarter, or it preserves my own choice in
evaluating evidence and arguments, something that beating me over the
head with the “obvious truth” does not do. It also shows more respect
to those who disagree, since it acknowledges their points rather than
treating them as stupid.
B. Wood wrote a Ph.D. dissertation for Fordham University entitled,
“Surprised by suffering: Hume, Draper, and the Bayesian argument from
evil” (see here). He is no intellectual or academic slouch!
C. I have to admit that I was asleep sometime between Wood’s
narration of his own personal story, and his arguments regarding the
problem of evil. This is not because the podcast was boring: it was the
middle of the night, and it was time for me to sleep. When I woke up,
Wood was questioning whether atheists, within their naturalistic
worldview, really have the authority to offer moral objections to how
God does things, or, more accurately, to say that certain theodicies do
not work or are inadequate. I think that Wood was making a similar
point to what I have heard other Christian apologists say: that
atheistic naturalism does not provide an adequate basis for the
existence of morality or the trustworthiness of human reasoning, and so
it cannot legitimately offer a moral objection when it comes to the
problem of evil.
I do not want to get into the question of whether atheistic
naturalism provides an adequate basis for those things, at least not in
this particular post. Let’s assume for a minute that Wood and many
Christian apologists are correct that it does not. Would that
invalidate the problem of evil? Well, part of me can see how it could,
but part of me is rather skeptical. The reason part of me is skeptical
is that the problem of evil strikes me as rather hypothetical (this may
not be the proper use of the term “hypothetical,” but bear with me): IF
there is an omnipotent, benevolent God, as Christian theism says, then
why does this God permit evil and suffering? Are the omnipotence and
benevolence of God—-the picture of God that many Christians embrace and
advocate—-inconsistent with what we see in real life, namely, evil and
suffering? Obviously, the atheists asking this question do not think
that this God exists; they are not morally challenging a God whom they
think is real. The problem of evil appears to be raising the question
of whether Christian theism is internally inconsistent in some of its
tenets, or the implications of some of its tenets, and if reality
accords with what Christian theism says about God. In my opinion,
atheists can legitimately ask this question, whether or not their
naturalism provides an adequate basis for a belief in morality or the
adequacy of reason. Atheists can question the existence of God, not
necessarily on the basis of their own moral convictions or reason, but
on the basis of what Christians themselves say about God’s nature, God’s
attributes, and morality: is the world as it should be if Christians
are correct about the existence of those things? I hope that I am
making sense here, and that what I am saying is not too muddled.
D. Wood was saying that God may allow the world to be as it is
because that can produce character in us. Wood made clear that he is
not looking at this so much at the individual level: he is not saying
that suffering people are guinea pigs for the moral maturation of the
well-off people, as the suffering people provide the well-off people
with opportunities to show compassion and to help. Rather, Wood is
looking at the group level. He is asking what kind of world would be
more conducive towards human beings working together and building
character.
I actually like Wood’s way of looking at this. One can ask, as some
atheists have, whether the pain and suffering that exist in this world
are overkill, whether, if there were a God, this God could accomplish
the job of building character in us without allowing pain and suffering
to the extent that they exist. This is a legitimate question. Where it
boils down to for me personally is that I believe in God, and, that
being the case, I feel as if I have to account somehow for why God
allows pain and suffering. Just saying that God is higher than we are
and we do not know the reason for suffering is not sufficient for me,
for this sort of agnosticism can be used to justify all sorts of
positions; it comes across as a cop-out. Saying that God allows pain
and suffering for our moral improvement at least provides a reason for
the pain and suffering, a reason that I think is plausible, on some
level.
E. Wood was contrasting the world as it is with the hedonistic world
that he believes atheists think would exist if there were a God. Wood
seems to believe that the world as it is is preferable, in terms of us
developing morally. My understanding is, however, that many Christians
would say that a hedonistic world is not out of the question for God.
Many Christians believe that life was good before the Fall of Adam and
Eve. Many Christians, along with Jews and Muslims, conceive of an
eschatological paradise, or paradise in the afterlife. This should be
addressed by Christian apologists. From an evolutionary standpoint, I
have issues with the historicity of a literal Adam and Eve, and I can
conceive of God making a world that falls short of our standard of
perfection, since such a world would allow us to grow and to develop
morally. Can I envision an eschatological paradise? Yes, in a sense. I
believe that the world is as it is for a reason, because this is how it
is supposed to be at this stage of history, but that God may have a
legitimate reason for the world to be different in the future—-maybe
because God will conclude that we no longer need to be in the school of
suffering, or that we have learned lessons from it to teach our children
and grandchildren.
F. Wood was also saying that God is not obligated to help the world,
since the world is in rebellion against God. I am not entirely
convinced by this: God commands us to love our enemies, so is it not
reasonable to expect God to live up to the same standard? Moreover,
there are enough times in the Bible when God does help people, so God is
not choosing to be entirely aloof from the world on account of its
sins. At the same time, I wonder if there is something to what Wood is
saying. Whether or not one believes in a literal, historical Fall,
could our sins be one reason that we do not have the divine protection
that we, as a world, may want? I would rather not see God as overly
punitive; at the same time, I can understand why God may choose not to
honor sin.
Again, I do not think that Wood is looking at this on an individual
level: I am suffering because God is punishing me for a sin that I
personally committed. Rather, Wood seems to be looking at the issue
communally: we as a world have sinned, and God may be responding to that
by becoming more aloof, by not extending the level of divine protection
that we may like, or by allowing the consequences of our sins to play
out.
G. Wood made the interesting point that the problem of evil emerged
with Epicurianism (at least that is my understanding of what Wood was
saying). Epicurus placed a high value on hedonism. If we are not
happy, does that cast questions on the existence of God, who is supposed
to make us happy? (My understanding is that Epicureans believed that
the gods were aloof anyway, but Wood’s point seems to be that an
emphasis on hedonism set the stage for the problem of evil to become a
problem, in terms of leading people to question the existence of God.)
According to Wood, the apostle Paul did not wrestle with why a good God
was allowing him to suffer.
I had to think some about Wood’s point here, in terms of the Bible. I
would say that, in an overall sense, Wood may be on to something. Job
and the Psalmist lamented about their sufferings, and maybe even went so
far as to question God’s love and justice. They did not conclude,
however, that God did not exist. At the same time, when Israel
suffered, other nations would ask them, “Where is your god?” Israel’s
suffering reinforced in the other nations’ minds that Israel’s god was
not as powerful. (At least that was one take on it: other nations also
believed that Israel was suffering because her own God was punishing her
for her sins.) That, in my opinion, may be a little closer to the
problem of evil: casting question on the legitimacy of a religion,
because the adherents to that religion are suffering.