I have two items for my blog post today about Joan Hoff's Nixon Reconsidered.
1.
On page 21, we read the following about President Richard Nixon's
environmental policy, specifically White House counsel John Ehrlichman's
contribution to it:
"Often using poll data, [John]
Ehrlichman----with his assistant, Egil [Bud] Krogh; John Whitaker, who
served first as Nixon's cabinet secretary and later as undersecretary of
the Interior Department; and Whitaker's assistant, Christopher
DeMuth----substantially influenced both Nixon's ideas and the content of
his environmental legislation by making it into a crisis issue. In
fact, Ehrlichman, who had specialized in land-use law in Seattle, has
been described by one forest conservation specialist as 'the most
effective environmentalist since Gifford Pinchot,' referring to the
controversial chief of the U.S. Forest Service under Presidents Theodore
Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. He and Whitaker put Nixon out in
front of Congress on environmental issues, especially with respect to
the use of the permit authority in the Refuse Act of 1899 to begin to
clean up water supplies before Congress passed any 'comprehensive water
pollution enforcement plan.' Curiously, Ehrlichman did not dwell on his
own contribution to environmental reform in his 1982 book, Witness to Power,
preferring to denigrate Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel, whose
anti- and then pro-conservation and pollution views he constantly had to
counter."
I thought this passage was funny. John Ehrlichman,
"the most effective environmentalist since Gifford Pinchot." Really?
But, come to think of it, I don't know a whole lot about Ehrlichman,
since I know of him primarily on account of what I have read about
Watergate. Maybe he was an environmentalist, for all I know!
The
part about Ehrlichman not dwelling on his contributions to environmental
policy in his 1982 book stood out to me. I am tempted to think that,
whereas Democrats liked to talk about reform, Republicans (specifically
the Nixon Administration) were actually bringing it about, and were
doing so in a low-key way. Maybe there's some truth to that (though one
should not undervalue the reforms that Democrats brought about). But I
doubt that it's the whole story. The paragraph opens, after all, by
saying that Ehrlichman and others used poll data. Why would they use
poll data, if they wanted their environmental policies to be low-key and
unknown to the voters? My hunch is that they would use poll data
because, on some level, they are crafting their policies according to
what would be effective politically, in terms of what would effectively
advertise the Nixon Administration to the public. This raises a
question that I have asked since I started reading Hoff's book, and that
I may continue to ask until I finish it (and perhaps even beyond): to
what extent were the Nixon Administration's domestic reforms motivated
by a commitment to principle, and to what extent were they
politically-motivated attempts to get votes? The impression that I am
getting was that Nixon was quite a politically-calculating person. But I
can't rule out from my reading that there may have been some noble
principles motivating Nixon.
2. On pages 62-63, Hoff talks about
the Office of Economic Opportunities' Legal Services Program, which
aimed to provide legal services to the poor. Under the Nixon
Administration, Donald Rumsfeld headed the OEC for a while, and (when
Rumsfeld was made Counsel) his replacement was Howard Phillips, a
conservative who wanted to dismantle the OEC. Howard Phillips would go
on to become a conservative activist, and he passed on recently.
"...in
November 1969 Rumsfeld believed that the White House was not supporting
his opposition to the so-called Murphy amendment, which would have
given each governor veto power over the OEO Legal Services Program
funded by that state without the OEO directors being able to override
the veto. This issue arose over Nixon's proposal to turn the Office of
Legal Services into a separate government corporation chartered by
Congress and funded at the local level with revenue-sharing funds.
Since it was evident that local officials might choose not to use
federal funds for such antipoverty programs, critics feared for its
survival. Women and Native American leaders were particularly concerned
about continued legal aid for their constituents. The White House went
to great lengths between 1969 and 1973 to respond that the president's
intent was to 'make sure that every citizen has access to legal
services,' while 'correcting the abuses which went on under this
program' and removing 'legal services from the recurring political
controversy which has attended it.' Nixon claimed, for example, in an
August 11, 1969, statement to Congress about restructuring OEO that
legal services to the poor would be 'strengthened and elevated' by
having independent status...Civil rights advocates and antipoverty
activists questioned both the motives and intent of the White House and,
like Rumsfeld, were against the obvious intent of the Murphy amendment
to allow governors to cut back funding for legal services benefiting the
poor. This prompted Ehrlichman, in a carefully worded memorandum, to
point out to Nixon that 'in view of Don's [Rumsfeld] public stance and
the nature of the opposition to Murphy's amendment you cannot favor the
amendment'...Nixon ultimately supported Rumsfeld over those in favor of
the Murphy amendment..."
This passage stood out to me for two reasons. First of all, it brought to my mind a passage that I read in Roger Morris' Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician.
Morris referred to a paper that Nixon wrote as a Duke Law School
student that defended legal services for the poor, and Morris regarded
that as ironic, in light of Nixon's efforts as President to undermine
the Legal Services Program. The thing is, according to Hoff, Nixon did
not feel that he was trying to undermine the Legal Services Program, nor
did he as President oppose the provision of legal services to the
poor. His whole point was that he was trying to preserve legal services
for the poor by making the program more efficient. On pages 64-65,
Hoff says that Nixon believed that the OEO's provision of money to
political groups like the American Indian Movement and the National
Welfare Rights Organization was resulting in the "diversion of funds
away from representing poor people in the courts." (This is a line from
a news summary, and Nixon indicated agreement with it.)
Was Nixon
right on this? Or would his policy have had deleterious effects on the
ability of the poor to be represented in court? I'm sure this was
debated. One reason that I like Hoff's book so far, however, is that
she presents Nixon's characterization of his own domestic policies: we
get to hear what he said about his own motives and agendas, not just his
detractors' characterizations of them. Some may say that Nixon was
giving the public spin. Perhaps. But his side of the story should
still be heard, and I would say the same about the perspectives of
others in the debate: the political groups who feared the consequences
of Nixon's OEO policy, Democrats, etc.
Second, Hoff refers to a
concern about Nixon's policy regarding the Legal Services Program: that
federal money would be given to the states, and the states would choose
not to fund legal services to the poor adequately. This was actually a
widespread criticism of Nixon's New Federalism agenda in general: that
it would give money to the states for certain programs, and the states
would choose not to spend all of it on those programs, choosing instead
to spend it elsewhere, or to use it to balance the state budget.
Unfortunately, as far as I could see (and I have not read all of Hoff's
book), Hoff does not adequately address this concern. She distinguishes
Nixon's New Federalism from the policies of Ronald Reagan, whom she
says did not particularly care for government involvement even at the
state level (which is interesting to me, since Reagan talked about
turning over power to the states, and yet it would not surprise me,
since there are many Tea-Partier types today who seem to oppose more
taxes and spending at the state and local levels, not just the
federal). According to Hoff, Nixon's policy was to give lots of money
to state governments, and they would use that money for certain
programs. But Hoff should have rigorously addressed the question: What
if the money would go to the state governments, and the state
governments would not use all of it for the programs?
I guess
that, ultimately, Nixon did oppose an amendment that would allow states
not to use money for legal services for the poor. His good, I suppose.
The thing is, it appears to me that he was doing so for political
purposes, and also because (on some level) his arm was being twisted by
Don Rumsfeld, whom I never envisioned as a progressive, but that's what
he apparently was in this case. According to Ehrlichman, Rumsfeld was
making a stink about the Murphy amendment, and that put Nixon in a
position of having to oppose it. I can't say that Nixon comes across as
particularly heroic, here (though I will say that he did come across as
more of a progressive hero in his policies regarding Native Americans,
at least in what I read about that in Hoff's book).