Tomorrow, I will finish and return Stephen Hayes' biography of Cheney, so I want to take this opportunity to share some more of its jewels. The book is Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
1. Remember when Bush's detractors were saying we should give the UN weapons inspectors more time? Well, Bush and Cheney had a good reason not to do so. They were basing their decision on what had happened before. Let Hayes explain:
"Cheney...believed that the UN had done too little to thwart Saddam Hussein's ambitions regarding WMD over the past decade and he had little confidence it would be successful if given another chance. Although the UN's inspectors had found and destroyed stockpiles of weapons, the record showed that at other times Saddam's regime had duped them. Cheney noted the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, who, after leaving Iraq in 1995, pointed inspectors to a chicken farm where they found evidence of the continuing programs. The lesson, said Cheney, is 'that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself'" (380-381).
So Saddam continuously misled UN weapons inspectors? And a defector showed us where he was continuing his WMD program? Why was Bush trusting the defectors rather than Saddam and the UN, again?
2. In July 6, 2003, Joe Wilson wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times contradicting Bush's claim that Saddam sought uranium in Niger (though, actually, Bush just said "Africa"). In three separate interviews, he claimed that Bush was relying on forged documents, and that he found this out on his trip to Africa.
Here's the problem:
"Wilson had traveled to Niger in late February 2002. The U.S. intelligence community had received the forged documents on October 9, 2002, more than eight months after Wilson's trip, when they were delivered to the U.S. embassy in Rome" (411).
Wilson retracted his claim after U.S. Senate investigators confronted him. But here's the interesting thing: Wilson's report to the CIA about his Niger trip said that Iraq was seeking uranium. Former Nigerian Prime Minister Ibraham Mayaki stated that "a top Iraqi official official in 1999...told [him] he wanted to explore 'expanding commercial relations' between the two countries. As Niger has virtually nothing else the Iraqis might have desired, Mayaki concluded that this request for enhanced trade meant one thing: the Iraqis wanted uranium" (413).
That's why the White House was so shocked about what Wilson was saying publicly. Not only was he stretching the truth (or, as he called it, "misspeaking"), but he also contradicted what he had said in a secret report.
3. I found this detail interesting: You know how Reagan's detractors always say that he was aiding Al Qaeda in Afghanistan? The truth is actually a little more complex. Sure, the mujahideen who resisted the Soviets in Afghanistan included Osama Bin Laden. But it also included people who became part of the pro-democracy government after the fall of the Taliban. After the Taliban fell, Sibghatulla Mujaddedi "headed...the traditional decision-making body that was convened after the war to select a new leader" (471). And he was one of the leaders of the mujahideen. So there were more people than Bin Laden in that group!
4. Have you ever wondered why Cheney is so secretive about what he reports to Congress? He says he doesn't want to compromise national security, and he has good reason to be concerned. In 1975, when Cheney worked in the Ford Administration, the Church Committee in Congress was investigating the CIA. Well, that committee didn't hesitate to leak sensitive information. As a result of the Church Committee, the Washington Monthly told the world (including our enemies) "How to Spot a Spook." The media outed the identity of covert CIA agents, one of whom (Richard Welch) was later assassinated. An article appeared that disclosed the existence of U.S. submarines off the coast of the Soviet Union (85-86). Not surprisingly, even as a Congressman, Cheney did not trust the legislative branch with top secret intelligence information. Who can be sure that it won't compromise our national security for political purposes? It has in the past. Sure, the executive branch has its leaks, but it at least tries to keep them under control.
So this is a good book. It is worth reading for its lucid presentation of another way of looking at things.